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I. INTRODUCTION
There is considerable controversy regarding the use of syndrome
testimony in Washington and other state courts. Consider an expert
witness's testimony during a criminal case, in which an expert asserted
that it appeared likely that the alleged victim had truly been raped
because she showed symptoms of "rape trauma syndrome."
Specifically, the expert testified: "[I]n every rape victim I have seen
they exhibit consistent symptoms .... For example, body soreness,
guilt, shame, feelings about the trial, nightmares, and flashbacks are
all common symptoms that rape victims experience. There is a profile
for rape victims and [she] fits it."1  Suppose this testimony was
allowed despite an objection from defense counsel.
Should an appellate court uphold the testimony about rape
trauma syndrome? In the actual case, the Washington Supreme Court
determined that a literature review of the scientific evidence was
necessary in order to empirically determine whether rape trauma
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1. This testimony was given in State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987).
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syndrome is a "scientifically reliable method admissible in evidence
and probative of the issue of whether an alleged rape victim was
raped."'2 The Court concluded that "[t]he literature on the subject
demonstrates that it is not."3
The court's analysis of the scientific reliability and legal
admissibility of rape trauma syndrome testimony illustrates how
psychology and law intersect. In such cases, the court evaluates
psychological science to determine whether a given syndrome is
generally accepted in its field. The court, in effect, conducts its own
meta-analysis of the literature by reviewing relevant studies to
determine which syndromes will be considered admissible as expert
evidence. The result of such an analysis influences the admissibility
of the syndrome evidence.
Several factors are important in determining whether a scientific
study would be relevant in evaluating syndrome evidence. First, it
would be important to determine whether studies show universal or
near universal symptoms for each type of trauma, and whether studies
show a wide divergence of symptom patterns, including true victims
who reported no symptoms at all. Also, it would be significant if the
studies demonstrate that less traumatized individuals only rarely
exhibit the same symptoms as traumatized individuals. Second, it
would matter whether the symptoms described fit a diagnosis listed in
the manual utilized by clinicians when diagnosing mental disorders,
the DSM-IV-TR. 4 If the factors listed in the DSM-IV-TR are not
present, then the syndrome evidence should not be deemed admissible
by the court.
This article will explore the legal and scientific validity of some
syndromes that purport to show that abuse and/or battering likely
occurred, and the validity of some syndromes that purport to show
that abuse and/or battering probably did not occur. Although the
syndromes in question may be useful in the clinical context, this
article argues that none of these syndromes are forensically useful
because they do not have diagnostic utility in differentiating between
those who have been traumatized by rape, child abuse, or battering,
and those who have not. Indeed, research evidence indicates that
traumatized individuals may exhibit any of a broad range of
2. This standard for admissibility was first articulated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923). See infra note 7 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Frye test.
3. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 347, 745 P.2d at 18.
4. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (DSM-IV-TR) (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
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psychological reactions-there are no universal symptoms of rape,
child abuse, or battering.5
Courts that allow mental health professionals to personally
evaluate a person who may have been traumatized and allow such
experts to make diagnostic statements in court that the person they
have evaluated suffers or does not suffer from such syndromes have
reached incorrect conclusions about the scientific acceptability and
validity of these syndrome concepts. Furthermore, courts that allow
such testimony from "experts" on one side in a criminal case will
usually have to allow the opposing side to present "experts" of their
own. This battle of the experts can launch an unnecessary
investigation into all areas of the person's life in a search for possible
other traumas which might explain the observed symptoms.
The better approach is for courts to not allow experts to
personally evaluate the allegedly abused person, and for courts to
allow only general mental health testimony about the symptoms that
traumatized individuals commonly exhibit. This general mental
health testimony should only be introduced when the other side has"opened the door" by claiming that the alleged victim's post-trauma
behavior was not normal or common for victimized persons. Even in
those instances, such testimony should not be allowed unless the
expert can support his testimony with published research. In other
words, experts should not be allowed to testify about what is"common" post-trauma behavior based merely on their own clinical
experience.
This article focuses on three types of syndrome evidence-rape
trauma syndrome, child abuse syndromes, and battered person
syndrome-all of which seem to be closely related to the diagnosis of
post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Part II provides background
regarding the Frye test, explains how mental disorders are defined in
the manual clinicians use, DSM-IV-TR, and outlines PTSD and
associated syndromes. Parts III, IV, V, and VI address both legal and
psychological concerns regarding specific syndromes and identify
what types of testimony Washington law allows in each of these three
areas. Part VII discusses the concerns regarding the scientific validity
of such diagnoses. Finally, Part VIII concludes this article by calling
for a standard of admissibility for syndrome testimony based on
reliable science, rather than less reliable testimony based on an
individual clinician's experiences.
5. See generally, 2 DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 2-143 (2002).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Frye Test
Jurisdictions use different legal tests to determine whether a
particular mental diagnosis or syndrome will be admissible as
evidence.' Washington uses the test expounded in Frye.' The Frye
test requires that the trial judge find that the expert testimony be
based on scientific evidence that is "sufficiently established to have
general acceptance in the field to which it belongs."' In other words,
the scientific techniques upon which the expert is basing his or her
testimony must be viewed as accepted in the relevant scientific
community. The primary diagnostic manual used by psychologists
and psychiatrists, the DSM-IV-TR, discussed below, contains only
those diagnoses which are considered to be generally accepted by
psychologists and psychiatrists; therefore, restricting one's diagnostic
statements to those contained in DSM-IV-TR would make particular
sense in Washington.
B. Mental Disorders as Defined in the DSM-IV-TR
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV-
Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR), which was published in 2000 by the
American Psychiatric Association, is the latest in a series of diagnostic
manuals that is updated every few years. Each DSM version purports
to list all of the currently accepted diagnoses in the fields of psychiatry
and psychology. DSM-IV-TR reflects a consensus within the mental
health community regarding the classification and diagnosis of mental
disorders. Although there has been some criticism of DSM-IV-TR
6. The two primary tests that courts use for novel scientific evidence are the Frye test and
the test articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7. See State v. Copeland, 130 Wash. 2d 244, 259-61, 922 P.2d 1304, 1314-15 (1996)
(reaffirming adherence to Frye test for scientific evidence in Washington). The Frye court
articulated the test as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.
293 F. at 1014.
In Copeland, the Washington Supreme Court declined to follow the test articulated in Daubert.
130 Wash. 2d at 259-61, 922 P.2d at 1314-15.
8. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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diagnoses,9 the disorders listed are thought to be the most reliable and
valid diagnoses, and they are considered to be the most defensible
scientifically. ° Expert testimony by mental health professionals often
includes the rendering of a diagnosis, and an argument can be made
that only diagnoses included in DSM-IV-TR should be utilized, as it"reflects a consensus about the classification and diagnosis of mental
disorders derived at the time of its initial publication."' 1
Despite the general acceptance of DSM-IV-TR in the fields of
psychiatry and psychology, the rendering of a DSM-IV-TR diagnosis
does not equate with any specific legal standard. DSM-IV-TR
explicitly recognizes that "dangers arise because of the imperfect fit
between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the
information contained in clinical diagnosis.''12 Furthermore, "a
diagnosis does not carry any necessary implications regarding the
causes of the individual's mental disorder."' 3
Almost all accepted DSM-IV-TR diagnoses are listed as "mental
disorders," and none are described as a "syndrome." DSM IV-TR
defines a mental disorder as follows:
[E]ach of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically
significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that
occurs in an individual and is associated with present distress
(e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e. impairment in one or
more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly
increased risk of suffering death, pain, or disability, or an
important loss of freedom. In addition, this syndrome or pattern
must not be merely an expectable and culturally sanctioned
response to a particular event, for example, the death of a loved
one." 14
DSM-IV-TR defines syndrome as "[a] grouping of signs or
symptoms, based on their frequent co-occurrence, that may suggest a
common underlying pathogenesis, course, familial pattern, or
treatment selection."' 5 Thus, all mental disorders are syndromes that
also meet certain additional criteria.
9. See, e.g., David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241
SCIENCE 31(1988).
10. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 4, at xxvi-xxviii (explaining how DSM-IV-TR criteria are
developed through both literature reviews and field trials).
11. Id. at xxxiii.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. atxxxi.
15. Id.at828.
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Perhaps the most important difference between a DSM-IV-TR
mental disorder and a syndrome is that DSM-IV-TR mental disorders
are thought to be accepted by a consensus of the fields of psychiatry
and psychology and have agreed upon and well-defined diagnostic
criteria listed in DSM-IV-TR. Syndromes, however, are not accepted
by a consensus of psychiatrists and psychologists, and do not have
well-defined and accepted diagnostic criteria.' 6 One of the biggest
problems in dealing with syndromes is that different commentators
have different ideas about which symptoms define a given syndrome,
such that each commentator invents his or her own syndromes. 7
What one commentator means by rape trauma syndrome, child abuse
syndrome, or battered woman syndrome, for example, may be quite
different from the symptoms another commentator is referring to
when using the same terms.
1. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
The diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) first
appeared in the 1980 version of the DSM (DSM-III), and the criteria
for diagnosing PTSD have changed slightly with each iteration of the
manual. PTSD is the primary trauma-related diagnosis included in
DSM-IV-TR. To qualify for a PTSD diagnosis a person must satisfy
six criteria, listed as Criteria A-F. The central features of each
criterion are as follows:
Criterion A requires that the person has been exposed to a
traumatic event in which the person both "experienced, witnessed, or
was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or
threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity
of self or others" and had a response that "involved intense fear,
helplessness, or horror."'"
To meet Criteria B, C, and D, a person must qualify for at least
one Criterion B re-experiencing symptom of the event (e.g. have
recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections ["flashbacks"] or
nightmares), three Criterion C avoidance symptoms (e.g. avoid stimuli
associated with the trauma), and two Criterion D increased arousal
16. See id.
17. See generally, J. David Kinzie & Rupert R. Goetz, A Century of Controversy Surrounding
Posttraumatic Stress-spectrum Syndromes: The Impact on DSM-III and DSM-IV, 9 J.
TRAUMATIC STRESS 159 (1996).
18. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 4, at 467. The requirement that the trauma be "outside the
range of usual human experience" was included in the DSM-II1-R, an earlier version of the
DSM-IV-TR, but has not been included in the DSM-IV or the DSM-IV-TR.
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symptoms (e.g. experience difficulty falling asleep, hypervigilance, or
difficulty concentrating).19
Criterion E requires that the symptoms occur at a clinically
significant level, and Criterion F requires that the person experience
the symptoms for at least one month.2"
Although PTSD was originally conceived to address the trauma
experienced by combat veterans, it was soon recognized that the
diagnosis had broad applications to all types of trauma, including
"interpersonal stressors" such as rape, sexual abuse, and physical
battering. Obviously, a person can suffer from PTSD based on more
than one traumatic event.
Two types of assessment tools are used to assess PTSD. One set
of instruments assesses the trauma (Criterion A), and the second
assesses the symptoms (Criteria B-F).21  Structured diagnostic
interviews, trauma-specific self report measures, and objective tests
such as the MMPI-2 can all be used. Research findings show that a
person who scores high on one measure of PTSD is also likely to have
a high score on other measures of PTSD (construct validity).
However, the few existing studies that test whether the PTSD
measures are measuring a construct separate and distinct from other
diagnoses (divergent validity) do not show especially promising
results.24 Many of the validated instruments that measure PTSD seem
to have good internal consistency and good test-retest correlations, so
several measurements of PTSD can provide reliable assessments.25
Studies that have assessed the sensitivity of instruments have found
that these instruments can generally correctly identify 80% to 90% of
the people who have PTSD, and studies that have assessed the
specificity of these instruments have also found rates of 80% to 90%,
suggesting that these scales diagnose non-PTSD sufferers incorrectly
only about 10% to 20% of the time.26
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Laura E. Boeschen et al., Rape Trauma Experts in the Courtroom, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 414, 421 (1998).
22. Id. at 422.
23. Id. at 423.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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2. Other PTSD Associated Syndromes
While DSM-IV-TR does not mention battered person
syndrome, rape trauma syndrome, or child abuse syndrome, it does
state the following:
The following associated constellation of symptoms may occur
and are more commonly seen in association with an
interpersonal stressor (e.g., childhood sexual or physical abuse,
or domestic battering): impaired affect modulation; self-
destructive and impulsive behavior; dissociative symptoms;
somatic complaints; feelings of ineffectiveness, shame, despair,
or hopelessness; feeling permanently damaged; a loss of
previously sustained beliefs; hostility; social withdrawal; feeling
constantly threatened; impaired relationships with others; or a
change from the individual's previous personality
characteristics. 27
Thus, DSM-IV-TR acknowledges that a wide variety of
symptoms can result from "interpersonal stressors."
"Interpersonal stressors" such as childhood sexual or physical
abuse, rape, or domestic battering can cause a wide constellation of
symptoms in conjunction with PTSD, especially when the abuse is
prolonged and repeated.28 PTSD symptoms often overlap with the
diagnostic criteria for several other disorders, including depression,
panic disorder, phobias, and obsessive-compulsive disorder.29
Epidemiological studies have found that 62% to 88% of those with
PTSD meet criteria for at least one other disorder.3"
III. RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME
There is a considerable body of scientific literature about the
commonly occurring psychological effects of rape.31 Rape victims
often experience symptoms of PTSD, such as hypervigilance, an
exaggerated startle response, difficulty concentrating, psychic
numbing, and repeated experiencing of the traumatic event (e.g.
27. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 4, at 465.
28. See JOHN N. BRIERE, CHILD ABUSE TRAUMA: THEORY AND TREATMENT OF THE
LASTING EFFECTS (1992).
29. See Jonathan R.T. Davidson & John A. Fairbank, The Epidemiology of Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder, in POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND BEYOND 147, 155-58 (Jonathan
R.T. Davidson & Edna B. Foa eds., 1993).
30. J.A. Fairbank et al., An Epidemiological Profile of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder:
Prevalence, Comorbidity, and Risk Factors, in NEUROBIOLOGICAL AND CLINICAL
CONSEQUENCES OF STRESS: FROM NORMAL ADAPTATION TO PTSD 415 (M.J. Friedman et
al. eds., 1995).
31. See generally 2 DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 104-143 (2002).
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flashbacks and nightmares).32 In addition to these PTSD related
symptoms, research indicates that rape victims show more depression,
anxiety, fear, substance abuse, sexual problems, and social
maladjustment than non-victims, particularly in the first year after the
assault.33 In describing testimony about these symptoms, courts often
refer to "rape trauma syndrome" because the argument on some level
is that the alleged victim either fits or does not fit the syndrome of
having been raped.
There are conflicting uses for the term "rape trauma syndrome."
These uses include the following:
The term rape trauma syndrome was coined by Burgess and
Holmstrom to describe a two-stage model of recovery
[consisting of an "acute" phase and "reorganizational" phase]
from rape among adult women. However, subsequent research
has conceptualized rape trauma in terms of specific symptoms
rather than stages of recovery. Moreover, rape is an example of
a traumatic event that can lead to the development of [PTSD].34
Further, rape trauma syndrome "often is described as a specific
type of PTSD."3 Thus, rape trauma syndrome has been described as
a two-stage model of recovery, as several post rape symptoms, or as a
specific type of PTSD, none of which are synonymous with each
other.
The question remains whether there is virtue or even validity in
suggesting the presence of a "syndrome." Thus, many experts avoid
using the term rape trauma syndrome since it is not in DSM-IV or any
of the previous DSMs, which suggests that it is not "commonly
accepted" in the scientific community.36 Also, because many courts
find the use of that term excessively prejudicial, experts generally only
testify about PTSD and the other scientifically well-accepted
commonly occurring psychological sequelae of rape.37
Expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome seems to fall into two
broad categories. The first includes testimony about obvious
symptoms that one would expect as a consequence of rape, such as
32. See generally Patricia A. Frazier, Rape Trauma Syndrome: The Scientific Status of
Research on Rape Trauma Syndrome, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 117-143 (2002).
33. See id.
34. Id. at 104. (citations omitted).
35. Id.
36. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
37. Washington courts recognize PTSD as an accepted diagnosis under ER 702. See, e.g.,
State v. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d 220, 233, 850 P.2d 495, 501 (1993); State v. Florczak, 76 Wash.
App. 55, 73, n.l, 882 P.2d 199, 209, n.l (1994).
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fear of offender retaliation, fear of being raped again, fear of being out
alone, and fear of men. Other symptoms include depression,
sleeplessness, PTSD, anger, guilt, and sexual dysfunction. 3' The
literature seems to suggest that these are common, but not universal,
symptoms after a rape.39 The second category is the explanation of"counterintuitive" behaviors that rape victims show, such as not
leaving the relationship,"0 being calm and composed after the rape,41
failing to report the rape for days or even months,42 recanting or giving
contradictory testimony, 3 and failing to identify the assailant or
remember some of the assault." Testimony in this category is offered
to rebut misconceptions or "myths" that jurors may hold about rape.
It is generally only allowed after the defense has "opened the door" by
implying the victim's post rape behavior was inconsistent with having
been raped.4 ' The notion that these symptoms are common after rape
is more debatable and may not be supported by the research
literature. 6
A. Expert Testimony Regarding Psychological Symptoms in Rape Cases
Most states allow at least some forms of expert testimony about
the psychological effects of rape in rape cases,4 7 and there is a
continuing scientific and legal controversy about such expert
testimony. a Most commonly, such expert testimony is used by the
38. Laura E. Boeschen et al., Rape Trauma Experts in the Courtroom, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 414, 418 (1998).
39. See generally Patricia A. Frazier, Rape Trauma Syndrome: The Scientific Status of
Research on Rape Trauma Syndrome, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 117-143 (2002).
40. See, e.g., State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 751 P.2d 1165 (1988).
41. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 431 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. 1988).
42. See, e.g., People v. Glover, 585 N.Y.S.2d 873 (App. Div. 1992).
43. See, e.g., People v. Housley, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (Ct. App. 1992).
44. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 510 A.2d 735 (Pa. 1986).
45. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 928 P.2d 600 (Alaska App. 1996).
46. See, e.g., Laura E. Boeschen et al., Rape Trauma Experts in the Courtroom, 4 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 414, 418 (1998).
47. See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291 (Cal. 1984), State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292
(Kan. 1982), State v. Robinson, 431 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. 1988), People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947
(Colo. 1987), State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 918 (Mont. 1984), Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036
(Wyo. 1987), State v. Allewalt, 517 A.2d 741 (Md. 1986), Simmons v. State, 504 N.E.2d 575
(Ind. 1987), State v. Huey, 699 P.2d 1290 (Ariz. 1985), People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y.
1990), State v. Hall, 412 S.E.2d 883 (N.C. 1992), Com. v. Mamay, 553 N.E.2d 945 (Mass.
1990), State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 271 (S.D. 1989), State v. Gettier, 438 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa
1989), State v. McCoy, 366 S.E.2d 731 (W.Va. 1988), State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192 (N.M.
1993), State v. Ogle, 668 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. App. 1984), People v. Stull, 338 N.W.2d 403 (Mich.
App. 1983), State v. Roles, 832 P.2d 311 (Idaho App. 1992), Taylor v. Com., 466 S.E.2d 118
(Va. App. 1996), Williams v. State, 928 P.2d 600 (Alaska App. 1996).
48. See, e.g., Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 341-350, 745 P.2d at 15-19.
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prosecution in an attempt to bolster the credibility of an alleged rape
victim when the defendant claims the sexual act was consensual.49
Often the defense uses an attack on the alleged victim's credibility
through analysis of her behavior after the alleged incident, with the
suggestion that her behavior is inconsistent with having been raped."°
For example, the defense may argue that the alleged victim's
inconsistent statements, lack of specific memory for certain details,
failure to promptly report the incident, her calm demeanor, or other
behaviors are not consistent with having been raped. To counter such
arguments, the prosecution may present expert testimony that such
behaviors are not unusual among rape victims, or that her behavior
was typical of rape victims."1
Proponents of allowing the State to present an expert who has
evaluated the alleged victim argue that rape allegations are particularly
difficult to prosecute because jurors subscribe to certain "myths"
about rape, which can sometimes only be rebutted through expert
testimony. 2 These myths include the idea that only chaste women are
raped, whereas women with a "history" must have done something to
encourage it. 3 Because of such myths, women who claim rape are
typically viewed with some skepticism, therefore leading to challenges
regarding the alleged victim's credibility. Often the result seems to
put the alleged victim on trial rather than the alleged perpetrator.5 4
Courts that admit RTS testimony usually do so because they
believe the testimony is being used to dispel such "myths."55 Courts
that do not admit RTS evidence usually believe the evidence is being
offered to prove that rape occurred. 6
Some jurisdictions allow the State's expert to testify only about
behaviors that the defense has already described as unusual for
someone who has been raped.5 7 In these jurisdictions, the expert's
49. See, e.g., Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 354, 745 P.2d at 21-22.
50. See, e.g., Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 341-352, 745 P.2d at 15-19.
51. See, e.g., Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 338, 745 P.2d at 338.
52. This opinion is also expressed in People v. Roscoe, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 48 (1985). The
court noted: "Expert testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome may play a particularly useful
role in prosecution for rape by disabusing jury of some widely held misconceptions about rape
and rape victims, so that jury may evaluate evidence free of constraints of popular myths." Id.
53. Laura E. Boeschen et al., Rape Trauma Experts in the Courtroom, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 414, 418 (1998).
54. See Michael Donahue, Another Door Closed: Rape Trauma Syndrome, 23 GONZ. L.
REV. 1 (1988).
55. See, e.g., Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 338, 745 P.2d at 18.
56. Id. "The defendant contends that expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome is
unfairly prejudicial because it constitutes an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant, thereby
invading the exclusive province of the finder of fact. We agree." Id.
57. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 928 P.2d 600 (Alaska App. 1996).
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opinion would generally be put on by the State in rebuttal, and it
could only address those topics for which the defense had already"opened the door." Usually in these cases, the expert would not have
personally evaluated the alleged victim.
Another approach is for the expert to be allowed to testify about
common reactions to rape and about general diagnostic criteria for
PTSD;58 again, in these cases the expert usually would not have
personally evaluated the alleged victim. Often friends and relatives of
the alleged victim will testify about her symptoms after the alleged
rape. Such lay testimony is allowed in Washington. 9
Courts are more inclined to allow expert testimony from an
expert who has not personally evaluated the alleged victim.6° If the
expert has not evaluated the alleged victim, he cannot make diagnostic
statements about her. Courts favor expert testimony in which the
expert has not evaluated the alleged victim because of the fear that
experts who have evaluated the alleged victim will add a special aura
of credibility to the victim, thus unfairly prejudicing the defendant.
However, even if the expert has not personally evaluated the alleged
victim, he may still be allowed to state whether her behavior was
consistent with PTSD or RTS, if the behavior is described to him by
means of a hypothetical question. Obviously this "opens the door" for
the defense to bring in its own expert to testify that the behavior is not
consistent with PTSD or RTS, or that the behavior is also consistent
with not having been raped, or that the symptoms could have been the
result of some other trauma.
Maryland is the only state in which a court has allowed the
expert to go beyond a diagnosis by stating that the victim was telling
the truth, or that she actually was raped, or both." However, that
opinion has been criticized for allowing testimony that was beyond the
scientific knowledge of the expert and better left for the trier of fact to
determine.62 This type of testimony clearly bears directly on the
victim's credibility, which should be left up to the judge or the jury.
Because the expert was allowed to offer an opinion about whether the
victim had been raped, the court stated that in such cases compulsory
58. "[C]ourts are mostly in agreement that expert testimony can be offered to show that the
alleged victim's behavior is not inconsistent with being raped, especially including a diagnosis of
PTSD." 2 D. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 117 (2002).
59. See, e.g., State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987); State v. Jaquez, 99
Wash. App. 1049, 2000 WL 241260 (App. Div. 2 2000).
60. See, e.g., State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987).
61. Statev. Allewalt, 517 A.2d 741 (Md. 1986).
62. Laura E. Boeschen et al., Rape Trauma Experts in the Courtroom, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 414, 428 (1998).
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psychiatric examination of the victim by a defense expert would likely
have to be allowed.63
There are also practical and emotional consequences to consider
in making decisions concerning rape trauma syndrome testimony. As
soon as a court allows the State to present expert diagnostic
information about the alleged victim from an expert who has
personally evaluated her, the defense will seek to compel an evaluation
conducted by a defense expert. In order to make a diagnostic
statement the expert will have to explore all possible traumas which
could have caused the symptoms, especially prior traumatic sexual
experiences, since the PTSD could have resulted from traumas other
than the alleged rape. Indeed, many if not most aspects of the victim's
life would become fair game, since diagnosticians are not supposed to
make diagnostic statements until they have acquired a thorough
history of the individual's entire life. Past psychiatric and counseling
records would have to be turned over to the defense attorney for
examination. As a result, many if not all aspects of the victim's life
would likely be explored in the courtroom.
B. Washington's Approach to Rape Trauma Syndrome
Washington generally does not allow evidence of rape trauma
syndrome to be admitted into the courtroom. In State v. Black, the
Washington State Supreme Court established the rule that expert
testimony about rape trauma syndrome is inadmissible in rape cases
because it is "not [a] scientifically reliable means of proving lack of
consent" and it unfairly prejudices a person accused of rape."64 In that
case, the sixteen-year-old alleged victim said that a close family friend
and neighbor had raped her, but the defendant said their sexual
contact had been consensual.6" The victim's mother and friends
testified that she was emotionally distraught after the incident as she
had nightmares for several days thereafter, and the court held that
such lay testimony was proper.66 However, the State also called a
counselor from a rape crisis center where the alleged victim had sought
treatment, who said she had counseled the victim on a weekly basis for
several months "after the rape. '67  Over objection from defense
counsel, she was allowed to testify that "[i]n every rape victim that I
have seen, they exhibit consistent symptoms .... For example, body
63. Allewalt, 517 A.2d at 751. See also State v. Chapman, 18 P.3d 1164, 1174 (Wyo.
2001).
64. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 348, 745 P.2d at 18.
65. Id. at 338, 745 P.2d at 13.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 338, 745 P.2d at 14.
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soreness, guilt, shame, feelings about the trial, nightmares, flashbacks,
these are common symptoms that rape victims experience. There is a
specific profile for rape victims and [she] fits in."68  In response to
defense counsel's questions as to whether the trauma could have come
from sources other than rape, the witness explained that she relied
upon "what the symptoms show according to the rape trauma
syndrome."69
The trial court found the defendant guilty of third degree rape.70
However, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the testimony
about rape trauma syndrome should not have been admitted,71 and the
Washington Supreme Court upheld that finding, invalidating the
conviction.72 In doing so, the court did its own literature review of the
scientific evidence, and it concluded that "the issue is whether the
presence of various symptoms, denominated together as 'rape trauma
syndrome' is a scientifically reliable method admissible in evidence
and probative of the issue of whether an alleged victim was raped.
The literature on the subject demonstrates that it is not."73 To bolster
this point, the court cited a number of scientific treatises and
concluded, "One overriding theme permeates the literature on this
subject: namely, that there is no 'typical' response to rape."74 The
court also expressed concern as to whether a rape counselor could
really be impartial, stating that "rape counselors are taught to make a
conscious effort to avoid judging the credibility of their clients."75 The
court pointed out that the concept of rape trauma syndrome had been
developed to assist with treatment, not to determine in which cases
rape has occurred.76
Besides being scientifically unreliable, the court also opined that
testimony about rape trauma syndrome is unfairly prejudicial
"because it constitutes an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant,
thereby invading the exclusive province of the finder of fact." 77
Indeed, the court went further, stating that even if the expert had not
used the term rape trauma syndrome and had instead testified about"a form of post-traumatic stress disorder with rape as the likely
stressor," the testimony would still have been unfairly prejudicial to
68. Id. at 339, 745 P.2d at 14.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 350, 745 P.2d at 19.
73. Id. at 347, 745 P.2d at 18 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 343, 745 P.2d at 16.
75. Id. at 347, 745 P.2d at 18.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 348, 745 P.2d at 19.
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the defendant.7" In his concurring opinion, Justice Utter agreed with
the majority's result,79 but he indicated in his opinion that there could
be some cases in which rape trauma syndrome testimony might be
allowed.8" The Washington Supreme Court is one of very few courts
that have categorically rejected expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome,8' and the decision has been heavily criticized.82
While Washington has categorically rejected expert testimony on
rape trauma syndrome, it does allow general testimony as to common
symptoms suffered by rape victims if the defense "opens the door" by
asserting that the alleged victim's post-rape behavior was inconsistent
78. Id. at 349, 745 P.2d at 19 (quoting Allewalt, 517 A.2d 741). The court reasoned as
follows:
[W]e do not share the view, espoused by some courts, that an expert witness' decision
to avoid the term "rape trauma syndrome" thereby renders such testimony
admissible .... We find such semantic distinctions unpersuasive. In the present case,
the testimony of [the expert], whether it be denominated as a form of "post- traumatic
stress disorder," "rape trauma syndrome" or otherwise, was unfairly prejudicial and
hence inadmissible. We do not imply, of course, that evidence of emotional or
psychological trauma suffered by a complainant after an alleged rape is inadmissible
in a rape prosecution. The State is free to offer lay testimony on these matters, and the
jury is free to evaluate it as it would any other evidence. We simply hold that the State
may not introduce expert testimony which purports to scientifically prove that an
alleged rape victim is suffering from rape trauma syndrome.
Id.
79. Id. at 350, 745 P.2d at 19.
80. Id. at 357, 745 P.2d at 23 (Utter, J., dissenting). Justice Utter stated:
The facts presented in this case and the failure of the State to lay an adequate
foundation for its offered evidence compel the result reached. I do not believe that we
should keep from juries and judges in all cases the potential benefit of a field of study
accepted in many other jurisdictions. This type of testimony, properly qualified, may
help triers of fact to understand the mental state and behavior of the rape victim with
muted demeanor and behavior, or an incest victim who recants, or other rape victims
who do not conform to our legal system's shameful legacy of "out-dated beliefs, and
deep-seated prejudices."
Id. (citations omitted).
81. See Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 346-47, 745 P.2d at 17-18. The Washington Supreme
Court stated:
The admissibility of expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome has been considered
in a number of other jurisdictions. We find the opinions which exclude the testimony
persuasive. The courts which have admitted rape trauma syndrome testimony believe
it sufficient that the myriad of symptoms encompassed therein are "generally accepted
to be a common reaction to sexual assault." We find, however, that this is not the
relevant question. The issue is not whether rape victims may display certain
symptoms; the issue is whether the presence of various symptoms, denominated
together as "rape trauma syndrome," is a scientifically reliable method admissible in
evidence and probative of the issue of whether an alleged victim was raped. The
literature on the subject demonstrates that it is not.
Id. (citations omitted).
82. See Michael Donahue, Another Door Closed: Rape Trauma Syndrome, 23 GONZ. L.
REV. 1, 35 (1988).
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with having been raped. In State v. Ciskie, 83 the issue was raised as to
whether the prosecution (as opposed to the defense) may make use of
expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome in cases in which a victim
(as opposed to a defendant) is making the claim that she suffers from
rape trauma syndrome. In that case, the defendant and the alleged
victim had lived separately, but maintained an intimate relationship
for two years. a4 According to the victim, she had tried to "cool" the
relationship during that two year period."5 She claims that the
defendant forced her to have intercourse or engage in other unwanted
sexual activity on five separate occasions.8 6 After each incident, the
defendant would apologize.8 7 After the fifth occurrence, she contacted
the police, and he was arrested and charged with four counts of rape.88
At trial during his opening statement, the defense attorney
attacked the alleged victim's credibility, describing the State's case as"carefully rehearsed" and stating that all sexual contact had been
consensual.8 9 In his testimony, the defendant stated she would easily
have been able to call the police at any time if it had truly been
necessary.90
Karil Klingbeil, the head of the sexual assault unit at Harborview
Hospital, was called to testify as an expert witness for the State.9 The
trial court ruled that she could testify, but she could not use the term
rape trauma syndrome or offer an opinion as to the ultimate issue of
whether the victim was raped.92 The trial judge stated, "What Mrs.
Klingbeil, then, is really testifying to. . . is [the victim's] state of
mind. I rule that that's relevant... as the basis for inferring why [the
victim] acted or did not act in certain ways, failing to report or failing
to break off the relationship. It may not be used for inferring what
Mr. Ciskie did or did not do."93 Klingbeil did state at one point that
she had personally evaluated the victim and diagnosed her as suffering
from PTSD.94 She stated that the trauma which led to PTSD could
have been any unusual stressful event, not necessarily a rape or an
83. See State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 751 P.2d 1165 (1988) (decided less than one
year after Black).
84. Id. at 265, 751 P.2d at 1167.
85. Id. at 266, 751 P.2d at 1167.
86. Id. at 266-67, 751 P.2d at 1167.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 268-69, 751 P.2d at 1168.
89. Id. at 269, 751 P.2d at 1169.
90. Id. at 269-70, 751 P.2dat 1169.
91. Id. at 271, 751 P.2d at 1169.
92. Id. at 272, 751 P.2d at 1170.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 279, 751 P.2dat 1173.
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assault, and the trial court did not allow the State to question Klingbeil
on what she believed the trauma had been in the victim's case.9"
When the State asked Klingbeil to express her opinion about the
victim's behavior, at defense counsel's request the question was
phrased as a hypothetical case history that paralleled the evidence
presented by the State. 6 Klingbeil said the facts in the hypothetical
example were consistent with the cycle theory of violence and said that
the failure of the woman in the hypothetical to report the assaults until
two days after the last incident and nine months after the first was
characteristic of a person suffering from battered woman syndrome. 7
Upon appeal, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the
conviction, finding the expert testimony admissible under ER 702.98
However, the Washington Supreme Court went on to state that an
additional analysis also needed to be made under ER 403, which
requires courts to exclude evidence if there is any danger of unfair
prejudice.99 The court stated that if Klingbeil had indicated her
assessment of the victim's credibility regarding whether she had been
raped that would have been overly prejudicial.' 0 The court went on
to say that "[w]ith the benefit of hindsight, it would perhaps have
been preferable to bar the diagnosis portion of the testimony
altogether, to avoid the danger of the jury's inferring a diagnosis of
rape," but concluded that undue prejudice had not occurred, stating
that the trial judge had done "an admirable job of limiting the expert's
testimony to that which would be of maximum benefit to the jury." 0'
95. Id. at 279, 751 P.2d 1173-74.
96. Id. at 278, 751 P.2d at 1173.
97. Id. at 278-79, 751 P.2d at 1173.
98. Id. ER 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
WASH. R. EVID. 702.
99. State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 269, 751 P.2d 1165, 1173 (1988). ER 403
provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
WASH. R. EVID. 403.
100. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d at 279, P.2d at 1174.
101. Id. at 280, 751 P.2dat 1174.
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C. Other Considerations Regarding the Use of RTS Testimony
1. Defense Use of RTS-Battle of the Experts
If a victim is evaluated by an expert and the expert testifies that
she suffers from rape trauma syndrome, can the defense also have her
evaluated by their expert? If a prosecution expert personally evaluates
the alleged victim, he usually will take a history and make a diagnosis
based on that history. Most courts that allow one side to put on
testimony by an expert who has personally evaluated the victim will
also allow the other side to present a competing expert as "[i]t would
be fundamentally unfair to allow the use of such testimony by the
State.. .and then to deny its use by a defendant here."10 2
The prospect that each side could present an expert who has
evaluated the victim to offer their differing opinions of her history and
her diagnosis should give us some pause. For many years rape victims
could be cross-examined during trial as to their prior sexual
experiences. 113 The defense would attempt to show that the victim
had a promiscuous nature to support the idea that any sexual activity
with the defendant had been consensual.' Most evidence codes now
provide special protection for alleged victims of sexual assault, in what
are commonly called "rape shield statutes," which severely restrict
defense inquiries into the personal sexual histories of rape victims. lS
Washington's rape shield statute"6 provides that evidence of a
victim's "marital history, divorce history, or general reputation for
promiscuity, non-chastity, or sexual mores contrary to community
standards is not admissible if offered to attack the credibility of the
victim and is inadmissible on the issue of consent" unless a special
hearing is held to consider the appropriateness of such testimony in
advance. Thus, there is an obvious tension between rape shield
statues and the concept of allowing both sides to present diagnostic
information, since a diagnosis involves delving into virtually all areas
102. Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 1193 (Ind. 1989). See also People v. Wheeler, 602
N.E.2d 826, 833-34 (Ill. 1992).
103. For a critical analysis of historical court practices related to rape cases, see Vivian D.
Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
15-20 (1977).
104. Id. at 15.
105. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.020(3) (2003). The federal government and
forty-eight states currently enforce some form of a rape shield law. Cristina Tilley, A Feminist
Repudiation of Rape Shield Laws, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 45 (2002). For a list of state and federal
statutes restricting the admissibility of sexual conduct evidence in rape cases, see Harriett R.
Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade,
70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 765, n. 3 (1986).
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.020 (2003).
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of the individual's life, especially prior sexual experiences that might
also have been traumatizing. For this reason, some states do not allow
the defense to present expert testimony until the State has "opened the
door" by bringing up the issues of PTSD or RTS. 117 This gives the
State (and presumably the victim) the option of deciding whether she
wants to have her traumatic symptoms be part of the contested case.
2. Unsubstantiated Claims by Experts in Rape Cases
We have already established that the use of RTS or PTSD
symptoms is not a "scientifically reliable" means of determining
whether a given woman was actually raped. 8 In some cases, experts
may be able to provide important information when testifying, but
unsubstantiated, non-scientific testimony on PTSD and/or RTS can
harm not only victims and alleged offenders, but also the field of
psychology as a whole. There have been a number of cases, which are
discussed below, in which experts made false or unsubstantiated
claims despite an ethical obligation to avoid doing so. For example,
expert witnesses have sometimes described symptoms that have not
been documented empirically. In one case, an expert testified it is"very common" for a rape victim to ask the rapist not to tell anyone
about the assault, but there does not seem to be a firm basis for this in
the research literature.0 9
For example, failure to recall details of the assault has been
described by an expert as a common symptom,10 and an inability to
identify the rapist until years after the rape has been described as not
unusual."' However, neither of these symptoms has been
documented in the research literature as a "common" symptom."' In
Black, an expert testified that "in every rape victim that I have seen
they exhibit consistent symptoms,"' 13 but that contention is clearly not
supported by the research evidence, which shows a wide range of
responses to rape."' The claim of universality of symptoms is
probably never valid, and it may lead to problems in another case if
107. See, e.g., Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1986).
108. See infra pp. 464-466.
109. Lessard, 719 P.2d at 233 (Wyo. 1986).
110. Simmons v. State, 504 N.E.2d 575, 579 (Ind. 1987).
111. Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 510 A.2d 735, 739 (Pa. 1986).
112. See Patricia A. Frazier, Rape Trauma Syndrome: The Scientific Status of Research on
Rape Trauma Syndrome, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY 117-143 (2002).
113. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 339, 745 P.2d at 14.
114. See Patricia A. Frazier, Rape Trauma Syndrome: The Scientific Status of Research on
Rape Trauma Syndrome, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY 117-43 (2002).
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the victim does not suffer from a supposedly universal symptom of
rape. Used this way, RTS becomes a prescription for how all women
who have been raped must behave. The claim that symptoms are
common is often made, sometimes without much scientific basis. The
claim that certain symptoms are "consistent" with having been raped
is almost always valid, because some rape victims show virtually all
symptoms.
Thus, it appears that one problem with allowing such testimony
is that courts must grapple with whether each point raised by the
expert has scientific validity. A more even-handed approach would be
to never allow such testimony except in cases in which the state has''opened the door" to discussion of the psychological state of the
alleged victim. Testimony that is not research based often occurs in
response to claims by the defense that the alleged victim's behavior
was inconsistent with having been raped. Such unsubstantiated
testimony is truly more prejudicial than probative. On the other
hand, most statements made which are supported by the research
literature are arguably more probative than prejudicial.
3. Prejudicial Impact Under Evidence Rule 403
By far the most common objection to expert testimony on PTSD
or RTS in rape cases is that it is unfairly prejudicial to the
defendant.' i Courts are less likely to allow testimony that uses the
term rape trauma syndrome, and are more likely to allow an opinion
about PTSD."6 PTSD does not presume to be a scientific technique
for identifying common symptoms of rape. It makes no pretense of
distinguishing between traumatic events that are sexual and those that
are not. Furthermore, as opposed to RTS, PTSD has clearly defined
diagnostic criteria. If the testimony is used only to rebut defense
claims that the alleged victim's behavior was unusual for a rape victim,
the testimony is thought to be less prejudicial." 7 Some courts have
admitted testimony regarding a wide range of behavior for rebuttal
purposes." 8 Other courts have excluded testimony offered to rebut a
defense claim that an alleged victim's behavior was inconsistent with
that of a rape victim, such as testimony about the frequency of false
115. See, e.g., Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 348, 745 P.2d at 19.
116. See, e.g., Allewalt, 517 A.2d 741.
117. See People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291 (Cal. 1984); Commonwealth v. Mamay, 553 N.E.
2d 945 (Mass. 1990).
118. See, e.g., Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1986); Simmons v. State, 504 N.E. 2d
575 (Ind. 1987); Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 547 A.2d 355 (Pa. 1988).
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allegations among alleged victims. " 9 Proposed PTSD evidence is
more likely to be allowed if the expert discusses the symptoms
experienced by victims as a class, rather than those reportedly
experienced by a particular alleged victim. 2 Some legal scholars
recommend that experts not interview alleged victims in order to
reduce the risk of prejudice. 2'
4. Feminist Critique of Rape Trauma Syndrome
Feminists in particular have critiqued the concept of rape trauma
syndrome. 2 They point out that focusing on a woman's "symptoms"
after a rape makes her distress seem aberrational or pathological, and it
removes her reactions from their social and political context.'23 All of
her subsequent negative reactions are attributed to the trauma of being
raped-although some of the distress is clearly caused by insensitive
treatment by the police, the examining medical professionals, and the
judicial system, as well as the reactions of family members.'24 If
women who acknowledge having been raped are given psychiatric
diagnoses, and their reactions to rape are deemed to be pathologies and
syndromes, women's reactions to rape can be delegitimized, 25 turning
their coping mechanisms into symptoms of disorders. 26  The use of
rape trauma syndrome to explain counter-intuitive reactions, such as a
woman's delay in reporting rape, precludes examining these reactions
as adaptive behavior in the context of male violence against women.'27
Rape is transformed from a political or societal issue to a professional
issue-the focus shifts from stopping the violence to treating its
victims, and further shifts the focus from the "fear" of rape victims to
their phobic reactions and adjustment problems.121 Women are
implicitly told they do not need protection from rape, or more
determined punishment of violent men; instead, what they need is
119. See United States v. Funds Held in the Name of or for the Benefit of John Wetterer,
991 F. Supp 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). See also State v. Kinney, 762 A.2d 833 (Vt. 2000), cited in 2
FAIGMAN, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE at ch. 13, n. 10.
120. See, e.g., State v. Ritt, 599 N.W. 2d 802 (Minn. 1999).
121. Deborah A. Dwyer, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: An Argument for
Limited Admissibility--State v. Black, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1084 (1988).
122. See generally, Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric
Labeling, and Law, 88 NW. U. L. REv. 1271 (1994).
123. Id. at 1306.
124. Id. at 1298.
125. Id. at 1273.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1306.
128. Id.
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"treatment. '"129  The goal of the professionals is to resolve the"symptom" of distrusting men. 3 '
The problem with using rape trauma syndrome evidence is that
it replaces one set of myths with another. The myth that a woman
who does not report having been raped immediately has consented to
sex is replaced with the myth that the delay in reporting is a
"symptom" of a disorder. The myth that a woman who continues to
see or visit a man accused of raping her must have consented to sex is
replaced by the myth that such behavior is a product of a mental
disorder, since "normal" women would not react this way. Expert
testimony may be needed to explain that a woman may rationally
choose not to report a rape due to the likelihood of disbelief by police,
the possibility of retaliation by the rapist, the hostility of family and
support network, the stress caused by judicial proceedings, and the
stigma of being a rape victim. 3'
IV. CHILD ABUSE SYNDROMES
Another controversial "syndrome" that is the subject of expert
testimony is child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS),
which was formulated to explain contradictory and counter-intuitive
behaviors sometimes seen among victims of child sexual abuse. As
originally formulated in 1983 by Dr. Roland Summit, a California
psychiatrist, CSAAS describes five types of behavior that purport to
explain why some victims of child sexual abuse retract their allegations
or delay reporting them:
Secrecy. The perpetrator often swears the child victim to
secrecy, sometimes with threats the family will dissolve.
Helplessness. The perpetrator is often a family member or
someone trusted by the child, leading to passive acceptance of
the sexual behavior.
Entrapment and accommodation. The child learns to accept the
situation in order to survive it.
Belated, conflicting and unconvincing disclosure.
129. Id. at 1306-07.
130. Id. at 1308-09.
131. Robert Garcia, Rape, Lies, and Videotape, 25 LOY. L. REV. 711, 742 (1992)
(recommending expert testimony to explain these factors in a woman's decision not to report a
rape).
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Retraction. The child may retract the allegations because the
offender and/or other family members influence the child to
return the family life to normal.13 2
CSAAS was not formulated as a way to prove that abuse
happened because it assumes that abuse has occurred.
Summit expressly stated that the purpose of the CSAAS was not
to provide a sexual abuse "test," but to improve therapy and advocacy
for children.'33 The article provided impressionistic, clinical findings,
but no data of any kind. No comparison was made between child
sexual abuse cases in which the "syndrome" appeared and child sexual
abuse cases in which it did not appear. Similarly, no comparison was
made between unproven cases, or cases involving false allegations, and"true" cases, so there was no information provided that could help
distinguish actual cases of child sexual abuse from false allegations. In
short, no information was provided that showed whether the"syndrome" could determine (or even corroborate) whether child
sexual abuse had occurred.
The syndrome is essentially unfalsifiable because the defining
features are contradictory. That is, if a child says that sexual abuse
occurred, CSAAS presents an explanation that asserts such behavior is
consistent with abuse, but if a child recants the allegations, CSAAS
asserts that the recantation is also corroborative of child sexual abuse;
thus, claims of child sexual abuse cannot be falsified. In response to
such criticism, Summit himself stated that CSAAS was never designed
for the purpose of proving sexual abuse in any given case, even though
he acknowledged it had been so applied in several cases.'34
Various other terms have been used to describe the reactions of
child sexual abuse victims including child sexual abuse syndrome
(CSAS) and child abuse syndrome (CAS) 3' as "profiles" of behaviors
that may occur in child sexual abuse victims. These profiles may
include a wide variety of symptoms such as a sense of danger, sleep
disturbance, decreased interest in school and other activities, anger,
concentration problems, hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response,
eating disorders, bed wetting, sexual behavior such as excessive
masturbation, and sexualized behavior with anatomically correct
132. Roland C. Summit, M.D., The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983).
133. Id. at 190.
134. See Joseph T. McCann et al., The Science and Pseudoscience of Expert Testimony, in
SCIENCE AND PSEUDOSCIENCE IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 77, 101 (Scott D. Lilienfeld et al.,
eds., 2003).
135. See Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 832-36 (Pa. 1992) for a discussion of
various terminologies. See also Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 492-99 (Ind. 1995).
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dolls.136 Children's reactions to sexual abuse are also commonly
described as PTSD, a diagnosis that DSM-IV-TR allows to be used
with any age group. As mentioned above, PTSD neither presumes
nor concludes what is the source of the trauma. Thus, just as with
rape trauma syndrome, many different "syndromes" or profiles of
symptoms have been put forth as common among child sexual abuse
victims, and it is often not clear which clusters of symptoms are being
referred to when terms such as CSAS and CAS are used.
Child sexual abuse cases are typically difficult to prosecute
because there is usually no physical evidence and there are rarely
eyewitnesses. The court must often rely solely on the child victim.
The child's description of what happened may appear to be
questionable, as children often do not report the incidents
immediately, and when they do, they may not give all the relevant
details in the initial revelation. 137 Furthermore, children often retract
or alter their allegations, especially in cases of intra-family sexual
abuse. 3 The mere fact that the child is young and immature may
make the testimony of the child appear questionable, and children are
often not ideal witnesses. Furthermore, many jurors may be
distrustful of a child's accusations of sexual abuse.'39 The obvious
defense approach is to challenge the credibility of the child witness,
suggesting that the allegations are fanciful or fabricated. In response,
prosecutors often attempt to present expert testimony to suggest that
the child's behavior is not unusual among victims of child sexual
abuse, or to explain why the child may be showing the "counter-
intuitive" behaviors that a jury might otherwise interpret as showing
lack of credibility on the child's part. 4 °
136. Dara Loren Steele, Expert Testimony: Seeking an Appropriate Admissibility Standard for
Behavioral Science in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 48 DUKE L.J. 932, 943 (1999).
137. See John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB.
L. REV. 1, 110-20 (1989).
138. Dwight M. Wells, Expert Testimony: To Admit or Not Admit?, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1983,
at 673, 675-76.
139. Several jury studies have concluded that adult juries find children's testimony less
credible than adults' testimony because of skepticism over a child's ability to accurately observe
and recall events. See, e.g., Michael R. Leippe et al., Discernibility or Discrimination?:
Understanding Jurors' Reactions to Accurate and Inaccurate Child and Adult Eyewitness, in CHILD
VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING TESTIMONY 169-196 (Gail
S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds., 1993).
140. See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Or. 1982). The Middleton court
stated:
It would be useful to the jury to know that not just this victim but many child victims
are ambivalent about the forcefulness with which they want to pursue the complaint,
and it is not uncommon for them to deny the act ever happened. Explaining this
superficially bizarre behavior by identifying its emotional antecedents could help the
jury better assess the witness's credibility.
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Testimony about common symptoms of child sexual abuse can
be introduced by the State in two ways: either in the State's case-in-
chief or in rebuttal. Some courts allow the evidence to be presented as
part of the State's case-in-chief, a form of "anticipatory rebuttal" to
the expected attack on the child victim's credibility. For example,
California has adopted a rule that permits admissible expert testimony
to be presented as anticipatory rebuttal."' Other courts only allow
expert testimony from the State if the defense has "opened the door,"
attacking the child victim's credibility by suggesting the child's
behaviors were not typical of child sexual abuse victims. 142
Some states will allow the expert to personally evaluate the child
victim, and to make a diagnosis of CSAAS, CSAS, CAS, or PTSD.
4 1
Others will not admit any diagnosis or syndrome evidence, not
allowing anything other than the expert's statement that the child's
behaviors are not uncommon among (not "inconsistent" with) child
sexual abuse cases. The Louisiana Supreme Court decided in a recent
decision that the state cannot introduce expert evidence that the
alleged child victim suffers from PTSD in an attempt to prove that
sexual abuse occurred absent the defendant's "opening the door." 144
The Court stated that "[t]he literature concludes that a PTSD
diagnosis is essentially a therapeutic aid, rather than a tool for the
detection of sexual abuse" and went on to say that "[b]ecause causes
other than sexual abuse may trigger PTSD. .. a diagnosis of PTSD
does not reliably prove the nature of the stressor."'45 Like Louisiana,
most jurisdictions will allow some type of rebuttal testimony. Various
jurisdictions allow expert testimony introduced by the State to rebut
claims by the defense that the child's behavior is inconsistent with the
claim of sexual abuse. 146
More controversial is the introduction of statistical evidence to
bolster the claim that the child is telling the truth. For example, in a
Delaware case, 147 the trial court allowed the expert to testify that
"between thirty percent and forty percent of children recant, alter, or
otherwise minimize their original allegations of sexual abuse, but that
Id.
141. People v. Patino, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 345,349 (Ct. App. 1994).
142. See, e.g., State v. Chuvin, 846 So. 2d 697 (La. 2003); Steward v. State, 652 N.E. 2d
490 (Ind. 1995).
143. See Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1302 (Md. 1995) (allowed PTSD testimony for
context only).
144. State v. Chuvin, 846 So.2d 697, 707-09 (La. 2003).
145. Id. at 707.
146. See Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 499 (Ind. 1995).
147. Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269 (Del. 1987).
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fewer than five percent recant and maintain the altered statement. "148
The expert was also allowed to testify that it is "very uncommon" for
a victim's initial account to include all instances and details of the
abuse. 149 In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, refusing
to uphold the statistical evidence because "the expert was permitted to
establish a mathematical standard by which the trier of fact could
evaluate the complainant's trial testimony. '  Perhaps the most
extreme example of this type of evidence is the "children never lie
about sexual abuse" nostrum, now uniformly discredited as
inaccurate.15' The question remains whether accurate statistical
information should be admissible in alleged child sexual abuse cases.
A. Expert Testimony Regarding Child Abuse
Jurisdictions differ widely as to what types of expert testimony
they will allow the State to present in cases of alleged child sexual
abuse. At least two states take the absolutist position that no expert
testimony can be admitted in such cases. In Pennsylvania, despite the
fact that an expert did not "relate any of her testimony to the child in
question," the CSAS testimony did not meet the Frye test." 2 That
court went further, however, stating that even a general listing of
behavioral patterns, without any diagnostic term or "syndrome,"
would not be relevant because the patterns could neither be identified
as "abuse specific" nor be limited to sexually abused children.5 3
Indeed, that court even held that testimony offered to explain delays
and inconsistencies was not helpful to the jury because the versions
offered by the expert to explain them "are easily understood by lay
people and do not require expert analysis."'5 4  Kentucky's Supreme
Court has also totally excluded behavioral science testimony in child
sexual abuse cases. 5' In that case, the State's expert had only listed
148. Id. at 271.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 274
151. A. Vrig, Deception in Children: A Literature Review and Implications for Children's
Testimony, in CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY: A HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND
FORENSIC PRACTICE 175-94 (H. Wescott et al., eds., 2002).
152. Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 834 (Pa. 1992).
153. Id. at 836.
154. Id. at 836-37.
155. Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. 1996). The Newkirk court
reasoned:
In final analysis, the more that courts permit experts to advise the jury based on
probability, classifications, syndromes and traits, the more we remove the jury from
its historical function of assessing credibility. While a criminal may be facile with his
denials and explanations and a child may be timid and halting, we entrust to the
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some general reactions of abuse and had not testified as to a"syndrome," but the court held such testimony was not even"relevant."' 56 Florida has held that expert testimony offered to prove
the alleged victim of sexual abuse exhibits symptoms consistent with
one who has been sexually abused should not be admitted."7 On the
other hand, South Dakota has held that expert testimony that the
victim's allegations were "truthful" should have been admissible."5 8
Michigan courts allow testimony about common symptoms of child
sexual abuse, but refuse to allow any use of diagnostic terms or"syndromes."' 59
B. Washington's Approach to Testimony Regarding Child Abuse
1. Expert Testimony Used to Prove that Abuse Occurred
Just as was true for rape trauma syndrome, Washington does not
generally allow the prosecution to introduce expert opinion testimony
about child abuse syndromes in an attempt to prove that abuse
occurred. Generally, these attempts to prove that sexual abuse
occurred through testimony as to trauma related syndromes are
thought to be inadmissible comments on the guilt of the defendant,
which do not meet the Frye test. The courts often complain that the
syndromes testified about could be due to trauma other than that
which results from sexual abuse.
In State v. Jones, Division One of the Washington Court of
Appeals addressed two of these issues: (1) whether an expert can state
that she believes the alleged child sexual abuse victim is telling the
truth, and (2) whether the expert can assert an opinion as to common
post-sexual abuse behavior. 6 ' In Jones, the defendant Donnie Jones
was living with his girlfriend and her children from a previous
marriage, including her seven-year-old daughter, who had some
history of sexual acting-out."' The girlfriend testified she walked into
the bedroom and found Jones unclothed with the seven year old, who
was not wearing underwear, and whose nightgown was pulled up to
wisdom of the twelve men and women who comprise the jury the responsibility to sort
between the conflicting versions of events and arrive at a proper verdict.
Id. at 696.
156. Id. at 695.
157. Hadden v. State, 690 So.2d 573, 580-581 (Fla. 1997).
158. State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 271, 276-77 (S.D. 1989).
159. See People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 409-10 (Mich. 1990); affirmed by People v.
Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857, 859 (Mich. 1995).
160. State v. Jones, 71 Wash. App. 798, 863 P.2d 85 (1993).
161. Id. at 802, 863 P.2d at 89.
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her chest. Jones was sexually aroused, and had his hand on the girl's
stomach. 6 2 The next day the girlfriend spoke with her daughter, who
said Jones had rubbed her vaginal area.'63 Eventually, a school
counselor contacted Child Protective Services (CPS) after the girl told
him Jones had touched her vaginal area.'64
Jones was charged with first degree child molestation and first
degree rape of a child.'65 The girl was found competent to testify.166
The trial court ruled that the girl's statements to her mother, the
school counselor, the CPS caseworker, and the physician were all
admissible.'67 The CPS caseworker was called by the State as an
expert witness. 16  She testified over defense objection that her
assessment of the seven-year-old was "that this child had been
sexually molested by Donnie." '169 The case worker was cross-
examined about the sexual acting-out, and on re-direct the prosecutor
asked if it was common to see sexual acting-out among sexually
abused children. 170
Over defense objection, she testified both that it was common for
children who have been sexually abused to show sexualized behaviors
and also testified that it was common for sexually abused children to
"talk about having nightmares and dreams," which the case worker
referred to as "night terrors."' 7 The CPS worker and the school
counselor also testified that the girl had told them that Jones had
engaged in sexual behavior with her on more than one occasion.'72
During his testimony, Jones admitted touching the girl's vagina area
briefly during the one incident, but denied he had done so for
purposes of sexual gratification. 7 1 Jones was convicted. 17 4
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that "no witness may
testify as to an opinion on the guilt of the defendant" and stated that
allowing the CPS worker's statement that she felt Jones had molested
the girl had been error of constitutional magnitude.' However,
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 803, 863 P.2d at 89.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 804, 863 P.2d at 89.
169. Id. at 804, 863 P.2d at 90.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 804-05, 863 P.2d at 90.
173. Id. at 805, 863 P.2d at 90.
174. Id. at 806, 863 P.2d at 91.
175. Id. at 813, 863 P.2d at 95.
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because the evidence of Jones' guilt was "overwhelming," the court
found the error to be harmless.'76
The court then addressed whether the trial court had committed
error in allowing the CPS worker to testify that sexually acting-out
and nightmares were common symptoms of child sexual abuse. 7'
Noting that Washington had no clear-cut precedent regarding the
admissibility of generalized sexual abuse syndrome,178 the court held
that generalized testimony regarding a profile of behaviors exhibited
by victims of child sexual abuse must meet the Frye test.'79 The court
pointed out that the prevalent objection to such testimony is that a
general profile of specific behaviors is not specific to sexual abuse;
rather, the behaviors may be produced by other traumatic events in
the child's life. 8° The court also pointed out that a substantial
number of other state courts had decided that expert testimony
regarding a profile or syndrome of child sexual abuse victims is neither
admissible to prove the existence of abuse nor to prove that the
defendant is guilty.'8 ' The Court reasoned:
Because the use of testimony on general characteristics of
sexually abused children is still the subject of contention and
dispute among experts in the field, we find that its use as a
general profile to be used to prove the existence of abuse is
inappropriate. However, we do agree with the current trend of
authority that such testimony may be used to rebut allegations
by the defendant that the victim's behavior is inconsistent with
abuse (cites omitted). We further note that sexual acting-out
behavior has been viewed as more logically and clinically
indicative of sexual abuse than other generalized reactions to
emotional traumas such as nightmares and phobic behaviors.'82
The Court found that the testimony about nightmares had been
improper, but the error had not been sufficiently preserved; thus, the
case was affirmed. 83
In another Division One Court of Appeals case, State v.
Cleveland, the court addressed testimony concerning a child's
reluctance to testify. 84 The defendant in the case, Cleveland, was
176. Id.
177. Id. at 813-14, 863 P.2d at 95.
178. Id. at 817, 863 P.2d at 97.
179. Id. at 818, 863 P.2d at 97.
180. Id. at 818-19, 863 P.2d at 97.
181. Id. at 819, 863 P.2d at 98.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 821-22, 863 P.2d at 99-100.
184. State v. Cleveland, 58 Wash. App. 634, 794 P.2d 546 (1990).
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accused of statutory rape and indecent liberties with his eight-year-old
stepdaughter.185 At trial, the girl testified that the defendant had
rubbed her private parts with his finger; however, this version of what
happened was somewhat different than what she had said earlier to
other people.'86
Barbara Huffman, a child and family therapist, testified for the
State. 187 She testified that she had not seen the child in this case;
consequently, she only testified about typical behaviors of child
victims of sexual abuse and did not testify that this particular child
was a victim of sexual abuse.'88 Huffman testified that it was not
unusual for a child sexual abuse victim to be reluctant to tell about it,
and it was common for the abused child not to tell the full story
initially and to add or subtract facts as the events were retold.189 The
court, however, did not allow Huffman to testify that recanting of
claims of sexual abuse was also not unusual. 9 ° After Huffman's
testimony, the defendant testified, denying ever having abused the
child."' Mrs. Cleveland offered similar testimony, saying that the girl
had never reported her claim of sexual abuse to her, and that she did
not believe the accusations.' The defendant was convicted of both
statutory rape and indecent liberties.' The Court of Appeals stated:
Huffman's testimony did not espouse a theory proving guilt. In
fact, her testimony was not really an explanatory theory or
opinion requiring acceptance by the scientific community by ER
702 (footnote omitted). Huffman's testimony was essentially a
description of her personal observations of some of the
characteristics of child sex abuse victims. Her observations are
comparable to testimony of a physician describing characteristics
he has personally observed in his treatment of a particular injury
or disease. Huffman did not at any time offer an opinion that
[the child] was a victim of sexual abuse. Nor did she ever say
the testimonial deficits she described were limited to victims of
sexual abuse. Huffman did not imply, as Cleveland argues, that
Cleveland was guilty of the acts attributed to him by [the child].
185. Id. at 636, 794 P.2d at 547.
186. Id. at 637, 794 P.2d at 547.
187. Id. at 637, 794 P.2d at 548.
188. Id. at 644, 794 P.2d. at 551.
189. Id. at 644-45, 794 P.2d at 551-52.
190. Id. at 645, 794 P.2d at 552.
191. Id. at 637, 794 P.2dat 548.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 636, 794 P.2d at 547.
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Nor did she ever say or imply that [the child] was telling the
truth.'94
In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.'9
Thus, in Washington, it appears that a properly qualified expert
may testify generally about the reluctance of children to testify, and
may testify generally that children commonly do not tell the full story
initially and add or subtract facts as the events are retold. Such
testimony will be admissible as long as the expert witness does not
comment on the child's credibility, make references about the
defendant's guilt, or offer testimony about a particular syndrome or
diagnosis.
Similarly, another Washington Court of Appeals Division One
case indicates that evidence concerning recantation and delays in
reporting may be admissible. The case, State v. Madison,' involved
recantation from a five-year-old girl whom the expert had not
personally evaluated.'97 The defendant, Madison, was charged with
one count of statutory rape in the first degree."' A hearing was held
to determine the competency of the girl as a witness and to determine
the admissibility of the child's out-of-court statements."' After"strong reluctance, necessitating a recess," the child took the stand."'
The State did not question her about her accusations against Madison,
but over objection, the defense counsel was allowed to ask her if the
defendant had done anything to her, and she answered no.2"' The
court found that she was not competent to testify, but that the out-of-
court statements were admissible under the special child hearsay
statute. °2
At trial, the State presented all of the out-of-court statements,
and the defense presented the child's mother, father, and other
relatives, who testified the child had recanted her allegations against
Madison, and now claimed that someone had raped her at knifepoint
on a nearby trail. 203 In rebuttal, the State called Nina Auerbach as an
expert witness. 204 Auerbach testified that in her experience and in her
194. Id. at 646, 794 P.2d at 552.
195. Id. at 649, 794 P.2d at 554.
196. State v. Madison, 53 Wash. App. 754, 770 P.2d 662 (1989).
197. Madison, 53 Wash. App. at 758, 770 P.2d at 665.
198. Id. at 757, 770 P.2d at 664.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. WASH. REV. CODE §9A.44.120 (2003); Madison, 53 Wash. App. at 758, 770 P.2d at
664.
203. Madison, 53 Wash. App. at 758, 770 P.2d at 664.
204. Id. at 758, 770 P.2d at 665.
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review of the literature there existed a "recantation phenomenon. '205
She testified that there were a number of possible reasons for the
recantation, including the possibility that the original allegation was
false.20 6
The Court of Appeals ruled that Auerbach's testimony was
"offered to explain that one cannot necessarily conclude that a present
recantation proves the original accusation was false. "2 7  However,
since Auerbach merely stated that her review of the literature and of
major writers in the field was the foundation for her belief in the
"recantation phenomenon," the court determined that the foundation
for her testimony was "inadequate to permit an informed appellate
review. '" 208  Furthermore, defense counsel had not made necessary
objections or motions to strike to preserve the issue of admissibility of
her testimony for appeal.2 9 As a result, the case was affirmed. 210 The
court stated,
We express no opinion as to the admissibility of testimony
explaining recantation by a child victim in future cases ....
[W]e note there has been a considerable recent discussion of the
significance of recantation by child witnesses. A list of the
behavioral, psychological, and legal literature regarding
recantation in child victims collected by this Court is contained
in the appendix following this opinion. .. "
Later in the opinion the Court also stated that "[a] substantial
majority of courts considering the issue have approved the admission
of testimony regarding recantation and delays in reporting, so long as
the testimony is not presented to prove an element of the crime. "212
Thus, in future cases, provided that a proper foundation has been laid,
it appears very likely that recantation testimony will be allowed from a
properly qualified expert who has not personally examined the child
victim and has not offered any "syndrome" or diagnosis testimony.
Finally, in another similar Division One case, State v. Stevens,213
the Court approved the use of expert testimony that described
nightmares as being common behaviors of sexually abused children in
general. The approval of such testimony apparently overruled State v.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 764-65, 770 P.2d at 668.
208. Id. at 765, 770 P.2d at 668.
209. Id. at 766, 770 P.2d at 669.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 766-67, 770 P.2d at 669.
213. State v. Stevens, 58 Wash. App. 478, 794 P.2d 38 (1990).
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Maule, a case that also involved testimony about nightmares as a
common symptom of child sexual abuse.214 Prior to the trial in
Stevens, the court had ruled that the State could not introduce
evidence that the two children involved fit a "medical profile" of
sexual abuse. 21 5 However, the court did allow the State to elicit the
expert testimony of Dr. Jenny that, based on the expert's own
experience or training, she found common symptoms to exist in
sexually abused children generally.216 In response to a question as to"what behavioral signs and symptoms would be important for you to
have in putting together the whole picture," Dr. Jenny was allowed to
give the following testimony:
Things that are commonly found as part of sexual abuse which
(need) to be treated when they're found, things like sexually
acting-out, enuresis, which is bed-wetting, or daytime wetting,
and lack of bowel control, psychosomatic problems like
abdominal pain, headache, tantrums, nightmares, difficult
behavior that children have that make their management
complicated.217
The Court of Appeals ruled that because the defense had opened
the door by attempting to show the girls' atypical behaviors were not
the result of sexual abuse by Stevens, "[ft]he court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the evidence" of common symptoms of child
sexual abuse. 28 Dr. Jenny had not testified that the victims fit any
controversial profile or syndrome of abuse, and in a footnote the Court
stated, "Stevens does not argue and we decline to decide whether any
evidence of syndrome of sexual abuse is admissible under Frye. '219 In
another footnote, the Court stated, "There is substantial support for
the theory that recurring dreams or nightmares are a common
symptom of sexual abuse," and it cited six authorities for that
proposition.22°
Thus, in Washington, the status of the admissibility of expert
opinion that nightmares are a common symptom of child sexual abuse
seems confusing, particularly with Jones arguably over-ruling Maule221
214. State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983).
215. Stevens, 58 Wash. App. at 496, 794 P.2d at 47.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 496-98, 794 P.2d at 47-48.
219. Id. at 497, 794 P.2d at 48.
220. Id. at 491, n.6, 794 P.2d at 45, n.6.
221. Maule, 35 Wash. App 287, 295-297, 667 P.2d 96, 100-101 (1983).
Even if [the expert's] theory possesses probative value, in the abstract, the record does
not show the underlying facts or data are of a type "reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field." There is no evidence that [the expert] conducted any
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by making a case for the admissibility of such testimony,222 and with
Stevens223 also supporting such testimony. It appears that the relevant
factor in Stevens is that both of the child victims had reportedly had
nightmares in which they voiced the defendant's name, thus tying the
defendant to the nightmares, whereas in Jones there was no way of
tying the nightmares to the defendant, which led to the inference that
the nightmares could have been entirely unrelated to sexual abuse, and
could have been caused by other trauma.
2. Expert Testimony Profiles Suggesting the Defendant Committed
Abuse
There is considerable authority in Washington that an expert
may not comment upon characteristics of the defendant as being
common among child molesters, thus implying a profile or syndrome
of a child sexual abuser. These cases, discussed below, usually involve
commenting on the defendant's relationship to the child. For
example, in State v. Petrich, 224 Kathleen Kennelly of the Harborview
Sexual Assault Center was called by the State, and over objection was
allowed to testify that in "eighty-five to ninety percent of our cases,
the child is molested by somebody they already know. '22' The
Washington Supreme Court ruled that "[w]hile this statement was
made in the context of explaining the extent of delayed reporting in
certain types of cases, we believe its potential for prejudice is
significant compared to its minimal probative value (citations
omitted). On retrial, expert testimony should be excluded that invites
the jury to conclude that because of defendant's particular relationship
to the victim, he is statistically more likely to have committed the
crime. 226
Similarly, in State v. Steward, 227 a case involving physical abuse,
the State's expert was allowed to testify that in eight out of nine cases
he had seen "the injuries were inflicted by either live-in or babysitting
statistical study or that any other expert in the field made such a study. There is no
evidence that people working in the field attach particular significance to one or more
characteristics and whether certain broad characteristics noted by [the expert], e.g.,
"nightmares," are, without further explanation, considered adequate indicia of child
sexual abuse.
Id. at 296, 667 P.2d 100 (citations omitted).
222. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
223. Stevens, 58 Wash. App. at 491, n.6, 794 P.2d at 45, n.6 (1990) (finding substantial
support for theory that recurring dreams or nightmares are common symptoms of sexual abuse).
224. State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984).
225. Id. at 569, 683 P.2d at 176.
226. Id. at 576, 683 P.2d at 180.
227. State v. Steward, 34 Wash. App. 221, 660 P.2d 278 (1983).
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boyfriends. '228  The Court of Appeals ruled that "[t]here was no
scientific basis for that testimony and it was certainly highly
prejudicial. To admit it was reversible error. 229
In another case,23° State expert Nina Ousley from the Sexual
Assault Center at Harborview testified over objection that "the
majority [of cases] involve a parent-figure, a male parent-figure, and
of those cases that would involve a father-figure, biological males are
in the majority. ' '21 1  The Court of Appeals concluded that
"[s]ubstantive evidence prejudicial to an opposing party does not lose
its prejudicial character because it is offered during qualification of an
expert .... The relevancy of this evidence is not discernible. On the
other hand, the prejudice to [the defendant] is great. ' 232 The Court
held that even if the theory that the majority of perpetrators were
fathers were valid, and thus relevant under ER 404, its admission was
prejudicial under ER 403. The case was reversed and remanded for a
new trial.
In another case, State v. Claflin, 233 the State's expert testified
that it was her experience that forty-three percent of child molestation
cases were reported to have been committed by "father figures. 211
The Court of Appeals opined that "[a]n opinion that the defendant
statistically is more likely to have committed the crime because of his
membership in a group-in this case, his paternalistic relationship to
the victims-is inadmissible. "231
Similarly, sometimes a defendant's results on tests such as the
MMPI have been put forth as diagnostic of being a child sexual
abuser, but it is well agreed that such "profiles" are not forensically
useful. 236 Thus, it appears that in Washington, given the presumption
of innocence for criminal defendants, defendants must be convicted on
the basis of what they did, not who they are.
228. Id. at 223, 660 P.2d at 279.
229. Id. at 224, 660 P.2d at 280.
230. State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96 (1983).
231. Id. at 289, 667 P.2d at 97.
232. Id. at 289, 667 P.2d at 99.
233. State v. Claflin, 38 Wash. App. 847, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984).
234. Id. at 852, 690 P.2d 1190.
235. Id.
236. See United States v. Banks, 36 M.J. 150 (C.M.A. 1992). See generally Brian J.
Bigelow, Ph.D., On the Assessment of Children in Suspected Child Sexual Abuse in Light of Daubert
and Frye: Limitations of Profiles and Interviews as Scientifically Grounded Evidence, 46 J.
FORENSIC SCd. 573, 574 (2000).
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C. Syndromes Suggesting No Abuse Has Occurred
Some syndromes are introduced to suggest that the victim lacks
credibility, and that therefore the alleged abuse and/or battering likely
did not occur. These syndromes are usually proposed by the defense,
and they are used in an attempt to show the child victim is mistaken or
is mis-remembering the incident. Personal examination by the expert
of the victim may or may not be involved.
1. Parental Alienation Syndrome
The term Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) was coined by the
late psychiatrist Richard Gardner.237 As Gardner conceived of it, this
syndrome arises in the context of child-custody disputes, when one
parent (the alienating parent) induces a program of denigration against
the other parent (the alienated or target parent), which the child then
adopts. This syndrome results when the children are programmed by
the alienating parent. As Gardner conceived of it, when actual sexual
abuse is present, then the PAS concept is not applicable.238 Thus,
when the PAS concept is utilized in court, the argument is being made
that since symptoms of PAS are present, the likelihood that sexual
abuse has occurred is low.
The primary symptoms of PAS, according to Gardner, are (1) a
campaign of denigration by one parent against the other, in which the
child is empowered to mimic and parrot the denigrating messages, (2)
the child is given weak, frivolous and absurd rationalizations for the
deprecation, (3) a lack of ambivalence on the part of the child is
present (the alienated or target parent is viewed as the incarnation of
all evil), (4) the child claims that his or her dislike and hatred of the
alienated or target parent is all his or her idea, the so-called
"independent thinker" phenomenon, (5) the child reflexively supports
the alienating parent in the parental conflict, (6) the child has no guilt
over his cruelty to and/or exploitation of the alienated parent, (7) the
child uses "borrowed scenarios," using words that are generally not
found in the vocabulary of children of that age, and (8) animosity is
spread to the extended family and friends of the alienated parent.239
237. RICHARD A. GARDNER, M.D., THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME AND THE
DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN FABRICATED AND GENUINE CHILD SEX ABUSE xix (1987);
RICHARD A. GARDNER, M.D., THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME: A GUIDE FOR
MENTAL HEALTH AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (1992).
238. Richard A. Gardner, M.D., The Empowerment of Children in the Development of
Parental Alienation Syndrome, 20 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 5, 5-29 (2002).
239. Id. at 5-29.
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Gardner believed that false sex-abuse accusations emerge in
about ten percent of PAS cases. 240 Thus, if a child in a child custody
dispute makes sex-abuse allegations while showing PAS symptoms,
Gardner believed the likelihood that sexual abuse has occurred is very
low. He believed that CPS evaluators often empower such children to
put their innocent parents in jail by using anatomical dolls and
suggestive questioning to confirm pre-existing biases, and by claiming
that "children never lie" about sexual abuse. He also believed that
therapists often contribute to the pathological empowerment of PAS
children, especially when hired by the alienating parent.241
There has been criticism of how the PAS concept has been used
in court, both in the child-custody context and in the criminal court
context when one parent is accused of sexually abusing the child. One
article concludes that the hypothesized etiologic agent of an alienating
parent and a receptive child renders an unfalsifiable theory that is
tautological. 42 These critics argue that since there is no "commonly
recognized, or empirically verified pathogenesis, course, familial
pattern or treatment selection" in PAS, it cannot be considered to be
diagnostic.243 The same authors believe that indiscriminate use of the
PAS concept has led to widespread confusion and misunderstanding
in judicial, legal, and psychological circles, and state that some
jurisdictions have decided not to allow expert testimony about PAS.
The authors feel PAS has often been misapplied to many diverse
phenomena occurring in child-custody disputes. These phenomena
include normal separation anxiety, the child's inability to deal with
high-conflict transitions between leaving parents, visitation resistance
derived from a child's concern about one parent's parenting style, and
visitation resistance arising from concern about leaving an emotionally
fragile parent alone.
Washington appellate courts have apparently not yet dealt with
"parental alienation syndrome" in a criminal context, but a recent
Washington Court of Appeals case addressed PAS in a child custody
context.244 In that case, the husband admitted he had physically
assaulted his wife during their marriage.24 A psychologist testified in
front of the trial court that the husband should undergo a domestic
240. For a discussion of the relationship between PAS and false sex abuse allegations, see
RICHARD A. GARDNER, M.D., PSYCHOTHERAPY WITH SEX-ABUSE VICTIMS: TRUE, FALSE,
AND HYSTERICAL 238-44 (1996).
241. Gardner, supra note 238, at 23-26.
242. Joan B. Kelly & Janet R. Johnston, The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental
Alienation Syndrome, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 249 (2001).
243. Id. at 249.
244. In re Marriage of Shen, No.47362-0-1, 2002 WL 1011545, at *1 (Wash. App. 2002).
245. Id.
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violence treatment program before having any contact with his eleven-
year-old daughter.246 In contrast, the psychiatrist testified that the
husband did not pose any threat to the eleven year-old. 24 ' The trial
court then ordered that another psychiatrist evaluate the parties and
make recommendations as to visitation, and that psychiatrist
concluded that the child suffered from parental alienation syndrome
and opined there was no risk of harm to the child.24" The trial court
agreed in ordering a parenting plan that did not restrict visitation.249
On appeal, the wife argued that the trial court had erred both in not
requiring the husband to participate in domestic violence counseling
and in finding he did not pose a threat to the child.2"° The Court of
Appeals affirmed, finding that the parenting plan was not "manifestly
unreasonable," and by inference condoning the expert's use of the
PAS construct.25'
In another child custody case, In re Swyers,5 2 the trial court had
granted custody of a three-year-old girl to her mother with extensive
visitation rights to the father. 23  The mother accused the father of
sexual abuse,25 4 and the trial court entered a temporary order that
allowed for only supervised visitation and also restrained either parent
from taking the child out of the state.255 Shortly thereafter, the mother
took the child to Florida and hid her from the father;256 consequently,
the father was made the primary residential parent after he was able to
locate the child in Florida and bring her back to Washington. 257 A
guardian ad litem was appointed in the case. 2 8 The mother petitioned
again that she be made the primary residential parent. The guardian
ad litem did not support the petition, stating in a report that the
mother was showing "a continuing pattern ... to sabotage his [the
father's] ability to father his daughter."2 9 The trial court entered a
finding that the mother was undermining the father's role as primary
parent, stating that, "'parental alienation syndrome' is prevalent and is
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at *2.
249. Id.
250. Id. at*3.
251. Id. at*4-5.
252. In re Swyers, No.18754-3-III, 2001 WL 85178, at *1 (Wash. App. 2001).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at*2.
[Vol. 27:453
2003] Restoring the Use of Objective Psychological Testimony 491
a major issue in this case. ' 260  When the father requested attorney's
fees, the trial court granted him a substantial amount, and the mother
appealed. 2 1 The Court of Appeals (Division III) affirmed the award
of attorney's fees, citing intransigence on the part of the mother and
specifically citing with approval the trial court's finding of parental
alienation syndrome.262
2. False Memory Syndrome
A related notion of PAS is known as "false memory syndrome."
This concept arises in cases in which the child is accusing someone of
sexual abuse, but the accusations are likely not true. False memory
syndrome is thought to occur because of leading and suggestive
questions asked of children by family members, CPS workers,
therapists, police, and prosecutors.263
The concept of false memory syndrome is only partially
developed. The symptoms of the syndrome have not been delineated,
except the claim that a child's memories were "tainted" by improperly
leading and suggestive questioning. There is considerable empirical
authority for the proposition that false memories can be implanted by
leading and suggestive questioning, especially in children.264  In
Dependency of A.E.P.,26 the Washington Supreme Court discussed
two ways that alleged taint caused by leading or suggestive
questioning can be addressed, either in terms of the child's
competency to be a witness, or in terms of "reliability" of hearsay
statements made by the child.266 At the trial court level, A.E.P.
actually involved testimony by a psychologist, Stuart Greenberg,
Ph.D., who suggested the child's statements that her father had
sexually abused her were unreliable because of suggestive and
improper interviewing.2 67  Dr. Greenberg did not testify to the
260. Id.
261. Id. at*3.
262. Id. at *4.
263. The False Memory Syndrome Foundation, an advocacy organization founded by
Peter and Pameal Freyd for people who believe they have been falsely accused of child sexual
abuse, has been instrumental in helping alleged falsely accused parents sue their children's
therapists for allegedly implanting false memories of childhood sexual abuse.
264. Debra A. Poole & D. Stephen Lindsay, Interviewing Pre-Schoolers: Effects of Non-
Suggestive Techniques, Parental Coaching, and Leading Questions on Reports of Non-Experienced
Events, 60 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 129, 147-50 (1995); Sena Garven et al., More
Than Suggestion: The Effects of Interviewing Techniques from the McMartin Preschool Case, 83 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347, 354-57 (1998).
265. Matter of Dependency of A.E.P., 135 Wash. 2d 208, 956 P.2d 297 (Wash. 1998).
266. Id. at 227-228, 956 P.2d at 306-07. For more information regarding the test for
reliability of such hearsay statements, see State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).
267. Dependency ofA.E.P., 135 Wash. 2d at 220, 956 P.2d at 302-03.
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existence of any syndrome and had not personally evaluated the
child.268 Upon appeal, the Washington Supreme Court found that the
child had been incompetent to testify. 69
In a case involving one of the notorious Wenatchee child sex
abuse prosecutions,27 ° Division III reversed the trial court's decision
not to authorize funds for expert testimony regarding false memory
syndrome, which would have purported to explain how Detective
Perez's interviewing methods could have led to inaccurate
testimony. 7' In the offer of proof, the defense told the trial court that
it needed funds for a "false memory syndrome" expert because "the
syndrome explains how improper questioning can cause a child to
honestly believe she has been molested when, in fact, she has not. "272
Division III stated, "Expert testimony on why a child may make
untruthful, inculpatory statements went to the crux of... the defense.
We therefore hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied... the funds to secure expert testimony on false memory
syndrome. On retrial, the superior court shall authorize appointment
of such an expert." The prosecution appealed that finding to the
Washington Supreme Court, and the Washington Supreme Court
asked Division III to revise its findings in light of A.E.P. Division III
did so and again required the trial court to authorize funds for an
expert on false memory syndrome.2 73 It does not appear that the court
intended the expert to personally evaluate the child, but the two Carol
M.D. cases suggest that the expert might nonetheless be allowed to
testify to the presence of "false memory syndrome" if the expert found
it existed in a given case.
There is considerable research evidence indicating that an adult's
memories of actual events can be altered by feeding them misleading
information. For example, if a group of people watching a simulated
268. Id. at 219-220, 956 P.2d at 302-03.
269. Id. at 234, 956 P.2d at 309. For more information regarding the test for competency
of a child witness, see State v. Allen, 70 Wash. 2d 690, 424 P.2d 1021 (1967).
270. The Wenatchee child-sex-ring investigations generated a great deal of controversy.
At least 60 adults were arrested on 29,726 charges of child sex abuse involving 43 children. The
sex-abuse investigations have since been heavily criticized by the courts. All 18 people convicted
in the investigations now have been freed, with their cases overturned or by agreeing to plead to
lesser charges to get out of prison. Mike Barber, Victim of Wenatchee Sex-Abuse Investigators
Bears No Ill Will, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 10, 2001),
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/34703_wenal0.shtm (last visited Nov. 6, 2003). The
individuals accused subsequently launched a series of high-profile lawsuits. Id.
271. State v. Carol M.D., 89 Wash. App. 77, 89-90, 948 P.2d 837, 844 (1997).
272. Id.
273. State v. Carol M.D., 97 Wash. App. 355, 358, 983 P.2d 1165, 1166 (1999)
(withdrawing separate portion of earlier opinion and adhering to all other matters, including
payment of expert).
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crime or accident are later given erroneous information about the
details, many will later incorporate the false details into their
description of the event.274 Furthermore, it is possible to implant
entirely false memories, causing people to believe an event happened,
when it never actually happened, such as being lost in a shopping mall
for an extended period of time, being rescued by a lifeguard, or
surviving a vicious animal attack. 27' After being shown false
advertising copy about a visit to Disneyland and meeting Bugs Bunny
there, a substantial number of the subjects remembered meeting Bugs
Bunny at Disneyland, an impossibility, as Bugs Bunny is a Warner
Brothers character. 276  There is no doubt that law enforcement
authorities can unwittingly plant false memories through leading and
suggestive interrogations. Indeed, incorrect identification by a witness
is the leading cause of false convictions, and suggestive and/or leading
line-ups and photo spreads cause a significant number of those false
identifications. 277 The U.S. Supreme Court has established guidelines
to evaluate the harm caused by such suggestive procedures.78 In
addition, social scientists have done extensive research on line-ups and
photo spreads, and offer suggestions as to how to make them more
accurate.279
Memory distortions may also contribute to the failure to convict
a guilty person, if accurate eyewitness memories are undermined.8 °
Unfortunately, there is no way to tell altered, distorted, or completely
false memories from true memories, making it impossible to evaluate
an eyewitness in an attempt to uncover whether the memories are
"true" or "false." Thus, expert testimony about "false memory
syndrome" is usually given without the expert having conducted a
274. See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Edith Greene, Warning: Even Memory for Faces May Be
Contagious, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 323 (1980); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Hunter G. Hoffman,
Misinformation and Memory: The Creation of New Memories, 118 J. EXP. PSYCHOL. 100, 100
(1989).
275. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Our Changeable Memories: Legal and Practical Implications, 4
NATURE REVIEWS Mar. 2003, at 232, available at
http://faculty.washington.edu/eloftus/Articles/2003Nature.pdf (last visited November 5,
2003).
276. Id.
277. See generally, C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL
CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1996); Wayne T. Westling, The Case for Expert Witness
Assistance to the Jury in Eyewitness Identification Cases, 71 OR. L. REV. 93 (1992).
278. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
279. See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness identification Procedures: Recommendations for
Line-ups and Photo Spreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603 (1998).
280. See generally Fredric D. Woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 29 STANFORD L. REV.
969, 1026-28 (1977).
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personal evaluation of the witness. Therefore, the use of the term"syndrome" does not appear to be justified.
V. BATTERED PERSON'S SYNDROME
"Battered Woman Syndrome," a term originally coined by
Lenore Walker, 281 is often used to describe the cyclical nature of
violence in domestic relationships. Walker's theory suggests that
battering relationships often show a cyclical pattern with three main
phases: (1) a period of tension building, (2) the acute battering
incident or explosion, and (3) a period of loving contrition.282 This
conceptualization follows from learning theory, which points to
positive reinforcement in the third phase, often described as the
"honeymoon period. '283  The social learning theory of "learned
helplessness" provides a way of understanding why battered women
stay with their abusive males.28 4 Walker believes that the cyclical
nature of the violence psychologically traps the woman in the
relationship. 25 The battered woman feels there is nothing she can do
to stop the beatings, and she falls into a state of depression and learned
helplessness. 286 The batterer makes it clear by his threats and actions
that if she attempts to leave, she will be subjected to even greater
abuse.
Given the cyclical pattern of abuse, women who have been
repeatedly battered develop an ability to recognize the different phases
of the cycle. Battered woman syndrome has most frequently been
used in court to explain why a woman attacked her abuser in a non-
confrontational situation-the explanation is that the woman
recognized that the non-confrontational situation was merely a
temporary lull in the cycle of abuse, and that the woman was in a state
281. See LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, xv (1979) [hereinafter
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN]; LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME (Springer series, Focus on Women, v.6, 1984) [hereinafter WALKER, THE
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME]; LENORE E.A. WALKER, ABUSED WOMEN AND SURVIVOR
THERAPY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST (1994).
282. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 281, at 55-70.
283. See Lenore E.A. Walker, Assessment of Abusive Spousal Relationships, in HANDBOOK
OF RELATIONAL DIAGNOSIS AND DYSFUNCTIONAL FAMILY PATTERNS 338 (F. Kaslow ed.,
1996); WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN at 55, WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME at 95.
284. This theory was first discovered in an experimental animal laboratory by Seligman,
and then applied to battered women by Walker. See MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS:
ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT AND DEATH 21-44 (Richard C. Atkinson et al., eds., 1975).
285. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 281, at 68-69.
286. Id. at 42-54.
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of "anticipatory fear" of the violence she knew would soon resume.287
While someone outside the situation might view her actions as
unreasonable, the abused woman possesses a unique perspective that
recognizes the impending nature of the violence. The battered woman
has a heightened ability to recognize the cues that precede the
battering incidents, often referred to as "hypervigilance." Thus,
apparently trivial actions on the part of the batterer may incite lethal
assaults by the abused woman, as the woman perceives her situation
differently than a "reasonable" stranger to the situation would.
Additionally, abused women may perceive that the battering is
escalating in severity over time, so it may be "reasonable" for a
battered woman to believe that upcoming encounters may be more
deadly than those that have already transpired.
A. Washington Allows Defense Experts to Testify about Battered
Person's Syndrome in Self-Defense Cases.
A number of obstacles were present when lawyers and mental
health experts first attempted to use battered woman's syndrome as a
defense to homicide in cases in which the woman had killed her
batterer. First, up until relatively recently, the law of self-defense had
been based exclusively on the so-called "objective" standard. Juries
were asked to determine whether what the defendant did was what a"reasonable person" would have done when faced with the same or
similar circumstances. All individuals were expected to live up to this"reasonableness" standard without taking into account past histories.
Under this objective standard, self-defense was not allowed unless the
threat experienced by the defendant was "immediate." In other
words, the threat had to occur simultaneously with the act of self-
defense. A defendant could not claim self-defense based solely on
threats or violence that had occurred at some time in the past. Rather,
there had to be a necessity established for the self-defense, and the
response had to be proportional to the threat presented.288
In the 1970s and 1980s, virtually all jurisdictions began allowing
juries to take into account the particular mental make-up of a battered
woman in deciding whether her actions had been reasonable. Several
states, including Ohio, Massachusetts, Maryland, Missouri, and
287. 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 3 (2000).
288. See Brett C. Trowbridge, Self Defense as a Mental Defense, 19 AM. J. FORENSIC
PSYCHOL. 63, 63 (2001).
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Wyoming provided for admission of the battered woman syndrome
through legislation.289
In Washington's first important case involving battered woman
syndrome, State v. Wanrow,2 90 the defendant Yvonne Wanrow was
convicted of second degree murder and first degree assault. 9' Some
months earlier, Ms. Hooper's seven-year-old daughter had developed
a sexually transmitted disease. 92 Ms. Hooper had not been able to
determine who had molested her daughter, but on the night of the
shooting Ms. Hooper discovered it was the decedent who had
allegedly violated her daughter. 93 Ms. Hooper called the police who
said the decedent could not be arrested until Monday morning.294 Ms.
Hooper called Ms. Wanrow and asked her to come over and stay the
night in the Hooper house.29 Ms. Wanrow arrived with a handgun in
her purse.296 Ms. Wanrow's sister and brother-in-law also arrived for"added protection," and unknown to the women in the house, Ms.
Wanrow's brother-in-law went to the decedent's house with a baseball
bat accusing the decedent of being a child molester.297 The decedent
then suggested that he and the brother-in-law go over to the Hooper
house "to straighten everything out. '"298 When the decedent, a large
man who was visibly intoxicated, entered the residence, he was told to
leave, but he declined to do so.2 99 He approached a young boy and
said "My what a cute little boy!"3°  Ms. Wanrow, a 5-foot 4-inch
woman who at that time had a broken leg and was using crutches,
went to the front door looking for her brother-in-law to enlist his
assistance.3"' Not seeing him, she turned around, and saw the
decedent directly behind her.30 2 She later testified she was "gravely
startled" by this situation, and she shot and killed him in what
amounted to a reflex action.30 3
289. 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 2, n.2 (2000).
290. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1997).
291. Id. at 224, 559 P.2d at 550.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 225, 559 P.2d at 550.
295. Id. at 225, 559 P.2d at 551.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 225-26, 559 P.2d at 551.
298. Id. at 226, 559 P.2d at 551.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
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In instructing the jury about the law of self-defense, the trial
court directed the jury "to consider only those acts and circumstances
occurring at or immediately before the killing."3 °4  After the
instruction was given, Ms. Wanrow was convicted. Upon appeal, the
Washington Supreme Court felt the jury instruction was defective,
stating that the instructions should allow jurors to "put themselves in
the place of the appellant, get the point of view she had at the time of
the tragedy, and view the conduct of the [deceased] with all its
pertinent sidelights as the appellant was warranted in viewing it. In
no other way could the jury safely say what a reasonable prudent
[person] similarly situated would have done."3 Thus, the so-called"objective" standard for self-defense began to have a "subjective"
component.
In the next crucial Washington case, State v. Allery,30 6 the
defendant, who had been married for five years, experienced a
consistent pattern of physical abuse at the hands of her husband. He
often pistol whipped her, assaulted her with knives, and beat her with
his fists. 37 On one occasion, she was hospitalized when her husband
struck her in the head with a tire iron.30 ' Because the beatings had
been increasing in intensity and severity, she filed for divorce and
served her husband with a restraining order.30 9 Late one night when
she entered her house, she was surprised to find her husband waiting
there for her. According to her testimony, he threatened to kill her.310
After she unsuccessfully tried to escape out a window, she fired one
shot at him with a shotgun, killing him.311
The trial court refused to give the self-defense instructions
offered by the defense. 12 The trial court offered only the following
instruction on self-defense:
Homicide is justifiable when committed in the lawful defense of
the slayer when the slayer, even though mistaken, has reasonable
ground to believe the person slain intends to inflict death or
great bodily harm and there appears to the slayer to be imminent
danger of such harm being accomplished. The slayer may
employ such force and means as a reasonably prudent person
304. Id. at 234, 559 P.2d at 555.
305. Id. at 235-36, 559 P.2d at 556.
306. State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984).
307. Id. at 592, 682 P.2d at 313.
308. Id. at 592-93, 682 P.2d at 313.
309. Id. at 593, 682 P.2d at 313.
310. Id. at 593, 682 P.2d at 313.
311. Id. at 593, 682 P.2d at 313-14.
312. Id. at 594, 682 P.2d.at 314.
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would use under the same or similar conditions as they appeared
to the slayer at the time.313
The defense offered the expert testimony of Karil Klingbeil, who
was prepared to explain battered woman syndrome to the jury.
However, after extensive voir dire conducted out of the presence of the
jury, the trial judge decided not to allow the testimony.314 Klingbeil
would have testified that in her opinion, Allery displayed the
behavioral and emotional characteristics of a battered woman. 315 The
defense counsel was specific in explaining the purpose of the proposed
testimony. It was offered to (1) explain the mentality and behavior of
battered women generally, (2) to provide a basis from which the jury
could understand why the defendant perceived herself in imminent
danger at the time of the shooting, and (3) to explain why a battered
woman remains in a relationship that is physically dangerous.316
The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder.317
However, the Washington Supreme Court reversed on appeal.3 ' The
court cited Wanrow in holding that the self-defense instruction did"not make the subjective self-defense standard manifestly apparent to
the average juror, ' 319 adding that "[t]he instruction is inadequate
because it does not instruct the jury to consider the conditions as they
appeared to the slayer, taking into consideration all of the facts and
circumstances known to the slayer at the time and prior to the
incident. 3 2' The court concluded that "[t]he jury should have been
instructed to consider the self-defense issue from the defendant's
perspective in light of all she knew and had experienced with the
victim. ,,321
As to the admissibility of expert testimony about the battered
woman syndrome, the Washington Supreme Court cited ER 702,
which provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence, or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
313. Id. at 593, 682 P.2d at 314.
314. Id. at 595, 682 P.2dat 315.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 596, 682 P.2d at 315.
317. Id. at 592, 682 P.2dat 313.
318. Id. at 599, 682 P.2d at 317.
319. Id. at 594, 682 P.2d at 314 (citing State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 235-36, 559
P.2d 548, 556 (1977)).
320. Id. at 595, 682 P.2d at 314-15.
321. Id., 682 P.2d at 315. Other jurisdictions have also adopted a quasi-subjective test
which allows the jury to consider what the reasonable battered woman similarly situated to the
defendant would have perceived. See, e.g., State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985).
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experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise.322
The Court recited the rule's three-part test regarding the
admissibility of expert testimony in Washington: (1) whether the
witness qualifies as an expert, (2) whether the opinion is based on an
explanatory theory generally accepted in the scientific community (i.e.
the Frye test, as explained above), and (3) whether the expert
testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact.323
The qualifications of Klingbeil were well established and were
not at issue in the case. 324  Klingbeil testified in voir dire that the
battered woman syndrome was a "recognized phenomenon in the
psychiatric profession and was defined as a technical term of art in
professional diagnostic textbooks.""32  Klingbeil had testified in voir
dire that:
[t]he battered woman syndrome is comprised of three distinct
phases. In the first phase, tension mounts between the woman
and her partner and minor abuse occurs. More serious violence
follows and the woman experiences a sense of powerlessness to
do anything to stop her husband. Psychologists describe a
phenomenon known as "learned helplessness," a condition in
which the woman is psychologically locked into her situation
due to economic dependence on the man, an abiding attachment
to him, and the failure of the legal system to adequately respond
to the problem. Finally, there is a temporary lull in the physical
abuse inflicted on the battered woman, and she forgives her
assailant, hoping that the abuse will not reoccur.326
The court ruled:
We join with these courts which hold expert testimony on the
battered woman syndrome admissible. We find that expert
testimony explaining why a person suffering from the battered
woman syndrome would not leave her mate, would not inform
police or friends, and would fear increased aggression against
herself would be helpful to a jury in understanding a
phenomenon not within the competence of an ordinary lay
person. Where the psychologist is qualified to testify about the
battered woman syndrome, and the defendant establishes her
identity as a battered woman, expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome is admissible. This evidence may have a
322. WASH. R. EvID.702.
323. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d at 596, 682 P.2d at 315.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 596-97, 682 P.2d at 315.
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substantial bearing on the woman's perceptions and behavior at
the time of the killing and is central to her claim of self-
defense.327
Notice that under this ruling the expert is allowed to personally
evaluate the defendant and give an opinion as to whether the
defendant should properly be diagnosed as suffering from battered
woman syndrome. Some jurisdictions, however, do not allow an
expert to testify whether a particular person suffers from the
syndrome.328
Since its emergence in the late 1970s, expert testimony on
battered woman syndrome in self-defense cases has been admitted in
some form in every state.3 29 However, some evidence of self-defense is
usually required before the expert testimony may be admitted. For
example, a Wyoming case upheld a trial court's exclusion of battered
woman syndrome expert testimony because the underlying facts did
not support a chain of self-defense.33° In addition, most jurisdictions
require the courts to pay for expert witnesses on battered woman's
syndrome in appropriate cases with indigent defendants.331
In another Washington case, State v. Kelly, 332 the issue arose as
to whether the state could offer a woman's prior aggressive acts in a
battered woman syndrome self-defense case to show that she was not
always helpless, passive, and dependent as her expert witness
claimed.333 In Kelly, the defendant shot and killed her husband.334 At
trial, she contended her husband had physically beaten her during the
marriage, and at the time of the shooting she feared another episode of
abuse.33
327. Id. at 597, 682 P.2d at 316 (citations omitted).
328. See State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 1999). In denying such testimony, the
court stated:
Testimony on battered woman syndrome is limited to a description of the syndrome's
general nature and the expert is not allowed to testify whether a particular defendant
or witness suffers from the syndrome because the expert testimony may be perceived
as evidence on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence... or as an "unwarranted
Istamp of scientific legitimacy' to the testimony."
Id. at 811.
329. See Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and its Effects in
Criminal Cases, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpa/94Guides/Trials/Trend/ (last visited
November 1, 2003).
330. Duran v. State, 990 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Wyo. 1999). See also Lentz v. State, 604 So.2d
243, 246-47 (Miss. 1992) and People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 761 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
331. See, e.g., Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 313-14 (10th Cir. 1992).
332. State v. Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 685 P.2d 564 (1984).
333. Id. at 190, 685 P.2d at 567.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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The defense called an expert witness, who had personally
examined her and diagnosed her as suffering from battered woman
syndrome.3 6 In rebuttal, the State made an offer of proof from two
witnesses, one who said the woman had threatened him, and another
who said she had observed the defendant pounding on the back door
of the defendant's home with a shovel while her husband, Mr. Kelly,
was inside.337  Defense counsel made a motion to exclude the
testimony of both rebuttal witnesses, but the trial judge denied it,
stating that the character evidence would rebut the expert testimony
regarding "isolation" and "learned helplessness." Subsequently, the
jury convicted the defendant of second degree murder.3 '
Upon appeal, the Washington Supreme Court opined that the
expert's testimony had not been character evidence, as Washington
does not permit proof of character by opinion testimony. 39 The court
stated, "Mrs. Kelly did not introduce expert testimony to show that at
the time she shot her husband, she acted in conformity with
behavioral characteristics which were said to comprise the 'battered
woman syndrome.' Rather, the expert testimony was offered to aid
the jury in understanding the reasonableness of Mrs. Kelly's
apprehension of imminent death or bodily injury. ''340 As a result, the
Washington Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded for a
new trial. 41
Thus, in Washington, it appears that the State may not rebut
battered woman syndrome evidence by using lay witnesses to attest to
specific incidents in which the defendant acted aggressively in the
past, even if those behaviors were directed at the batterer himself. On
the other hand, experts in Washington can most likely testify to such
prior acts as foundation for an opinion as to whether the defendant
actually suffers from PTSD or battered woman syndrome.
The next important development in Washington in this context
was the extension of battered woman syndrome to the diagnosis of
battered children in State v. Janes.42 In that case, Janes's stepfather
sporadically beat Janes, a seventeen-year-old boy, over a ten-year
period.343 Janes had also witnessed violence against his mother and
brother.344 One night, after waiting in the home with his stepfather's
336. Id.
337. Id. at 190-91, 685 P.2d at 567.
338. Id. at 191, 685 P.2d at 567.
339. Id. at 194-95, 685 P.2d at 569.
340. Id. at 195-96, 685 P.2d at 569.
341. Id. at 201, 685 P.2d at 573.
342. State v. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d 220, 850 P.2d 495 (1993).
343. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d at 223, 850 P.2d at 496.
344. Id.
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guns for several hours, smoking marijuana and drinking whiskey, the
boy shot and killed his stepfather when he walked in the door. 34
At trial, in support of a self-defense instruction, the defense
called a child psychiatrist, Dr. Christopher Varley, who gave an offer
of proof. His testimony diagnosed Janes as suffering from PTSD
based on his personal evaluation of him.346 This diagnosis was later
repeated before the jury. Varley testified that PTSD impaired Janes'
ability to premeditate.347 He also stated that in his opinion, Janes
feared imminent harm on the day in question, even though Janes
himself had denied fearing imminent harm that day.348
The trial judge allowed Varley's testimony, but denied the
request for a self-defense instruction.349 The trial judge concluded the
circumstances showing threat were too remote and insufficiently
aggressive to justify a self-defense instruction. 30 The trial judge did
allow a diminished capacity instruction and additional testimony on
diminished capacity from psychologist Bruce Olsen, Ph.D., who had
also diagnosed Janes with PTSD."' In rebuttal, the State called Dr.
Carl Redick, a Western State Hospital psychologist, who testified
Janes suffered from long-term substance abuse, not PTSD, and that
he had the capacity to premeditate. 352 The jury found Janes not guilty
of first degree murder, but guilty of second degree murder.353
The Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case to the trial court to determine whether a self-defense instruction
and expert testimony were appropriate.354 The court enunciated the
principle that expert testimony regarding the "battered child
syndrome" was admissible in appropriate cases to aid in the proof of
self-defense.355 The court reasoned that battered child syndrome met
the Frye test of scientific admissibility, ruling it had achieved general
acceptance in the scientific community.3 6 The court stated, "We
conclude that the battered child syndrome is the functional and legal
equivalent of the battered woman syndrome, and find it admissible
345. Id. at 224-25, 850 P.2d at 496-97.
346. Id. at 226-27, 850 P.2d at 497-98.
347. Id. at 227, 850 P.2d at 498.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 227-28, 850 P.2d at 498.
350. Id. at 228, 850 P.2d at 498.
351. Id. at 228-30, 850 P.2d at 498-500.
352. Id. at 231, 850 P.2d at 500.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 242, 850 P.2d at 506.
355. Id. at 232-236, 850 P.2d at 501-03.
356. Id.
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under the Frye test."" 7 The court also ruled that admission of expert
testimony regarding battered child syndrome would have been
"helpful" to the jury under ER 702 because "[e]xpert testimony
regarding the syndrome helps the jury to understand the
reasonableness of the defendant's perceptions. 318
Citing Wanrow, the Washington Supreme Court once again
alluded to a subjective element in self-defense cases, such that the jury
could grasp what a reasonably prudent person similarly situated would
have done.359 The court reasoned that the requirement that the danger
of great bodily harm perceived by the defendant needed to be
"imminent" did not mean that it had to be immediate.36 The fact that
the "triggering behavior" is separated in time from an episode of abuse
does not negate the reasonableness of a defendant's perception of
imminent harm if in the past these two types of conduct have been"inevitably linked." '361 The court further stated that in an abusive
situation the fact "[t]hat the triggering behavior and the abusive
episode are divided by time does not necessarily negate the
reasonableness of the defendant's perception of imminent harm. "362
There remains a split among jurisdictions that recognize a
battered child syndrome defense. Many jurisdictions recognize the
defense,363 but others do not. 364
B. Washington Allows General Testimony Regarding Battered Woman's
Syndrome if the Defense has Attacked the Credibility of the Victim.
In a Washington Supreme Court case, State v. Ciskie,365 the
defendant was charged with four counts of rape. The expert
testimony of Karil Klingbeil was offered by the State after defense
counsel had attacked the alleged victim's credibility by describing the
State's case as "carefully rehearsed" and by claiming that all sexual
intercourse had been consensual.366
The trial court ruled that Klingbeil could testify, but restricted
the testimony in several ways.3 67 Klingbeil was allowed to testify that
357. Id. at 235, 850 P.2d at 503.
358. Id. at 236, 850 P.2d at 503.
359. Id. at 238, 850 P.2d at 504.
360. Id. at 241-42, 850 P.2d at 506.
361. Id., 850 P.2d at 506.
362. Id. at 241, 850 P.2d at 506.
363. See, e.g., State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1336 (Ohio 1998).
364. See, e.g., State v. Gachot, 609 So.2d 269 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
365. State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 751 P.2d 1165 (1988).
366. Id. at 269, 751 P.2d at 1168-69.
367. For example, Klingbeil could not use the term rape trauma syndrome and could not
offer an opinion as to whether the victim was raped. Id. at 272, 751 P.2d at 1170.
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the victim had PTSD, based on her personal evaluation of the victim.
Klingbeil stated that the trauma which could have caused PTSD could
have been any unusual stressful event, not necessarily a rape or an
assault, and the trial court did not allow the State to question Klingbeil
as to what she believed the trauma had been in the present victim's
case.368  Rather, she was only allowed to testify in response to a
hypothetical that a victim's delay in reporting the rapes was
characteristic of a woman suffering from battered woman's
syndrome.369
The Washington Supreme Court upheld the convictions, 370 but
stated that if Klingbeil had been allowed to give her assessment of the
victim's credibility, her testimony could have been overly
prejudicial.37' The Washington Supreme Court went on to state that,
"With the benefit of hindsight, it would perhaps have been preferable
to bar the diagnosis portion of the testimony altogether, to avoid the
danger of the jury's inferring a diagnosis of rape," but concluded that
undue prejudice had not occurred, stating the trial judge had done "an
admirable job of limiting the expert's testimony to that which would
be of maximum benefit to the jury. 3 72 In his dissent, Justice Dore
complained that the testimony had been overly prejudicial, stating,
"The testimony, in effect, put the defendant on trial for being a
batterer. 3 73
Thus, in Washington cases in which the defense has attacked the
credibility of the alleged victim and syndrome testimony is deemed
relevant, a properly qualified expert witness is allowed to testify for
the State about the general characteristics of those suffering from
battered woman syndrome or PTSD. However, the expert should not
be allowed to make a diagnostic statement that the victim in that
particular case suffers from battered woman syndrome or PTSD.
Some states also allow testimony about characteristics of battered
women if the defense "opens the door. ' 3 74 However, testimony about
the general characteristics of abusers is generally not allowed.375
368. Id. at 280, 751 P.2dat 1174.
369. Id. at 278-79, 751 P.2dat 1173.
370. Id. at 279, 751 P.2dat 1173.
371. Id. at 279, 751 P.2dat 1174.
372. Id. at 280, 751 P.2d at 1174.
373. Id. at 286, 751 P.2d at 1177 (Dore, J., dissenting).
374. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375 (N.J. 1984); Parrish v. State, 514 S.E.2d 458,
463 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
375. See Parrish, 514 S.E.2d at 463; Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 55 (Wyo. 1999).
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C. Washington Allows Expert Testimony Regarding Battered Woman's
Syndrome in Cases of Duress
Battered woman syndrome can also be used in Washington in
cases of alleged duress. In State v. Riker, 376 the defendant raised the
defense of duress to charges of delivery and possession of cocaine.377
She claimed that a police informant, Mr. Burke, coerced her into the
crime with verbal threats,"' and she contended that her history as a
battered woman in other relationships should have been made known
to the jury.379 The defendant Riker offered the testimony of Karil
Klingbeil on the subject, 380 but the trial court disallowed the expert's
testimony.381 On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's conviction.382
Riker testified that Burke had once forced her sister to give Riker
some rings in exchange for $20 to buy cocaine, had once pushed her
sister against the wall, and had threatened to harm her sister if Riker
did not obtain cocaine for him.383 Riker further testified that Burke
had never hit her,384 but also testified regarding her own past history of
abusive relationships to support her duress defense, stating her fear of
Burke.38" During her offer of proof, Klingbeil admitted that the use of
the battered woman syndrome in a case where there was not an
intimate relationship between the batterer and the victim was"novel. "386
The Washington Supreme Court ruled that it had been proper
for the trial court to exclude Klingbeil's testimony because the
defendant's actions had occurred "outside of a battering
relationship," '387 and in the court's opinion there was not scientific
acceptance (i.e. the Frye test was not met) of battered woman
syndrome when applied to behavior that occurred outside the context
of a battering relationship.388 In the court's opinion, there was not "a
reliable method of applying the theory to the facts of the case."38 9 In
376. State v. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d 351, 869 P.2d 43 (1994).
377. Id. at 353, 869 P.2d at 45.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. In the case, Klingbeil had personally evaluated the defendant and had diagnosed her
as suffering from battered woman syndrome based on her past history of abusive relationships.
381. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 357, 869 P.2d at 47.
382. Id. at 370, 869 P.2d at 53.
383. Id. at 356, 869 P.2dat 46.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 357, 869 P.2d at 46.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 359, 869 P.2d at 47.
388. Id. at 359-364, 869 P.2d at 47-50.
389. Id. at 363, 869 P.2d at 50.
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his dissent, Justice Utter thought the proposed use of the expert
testimony was no different than in Allery, 390 i.e., to explain "to the jury
the concepts of learned helplessness and how a battered person
assesses danger,, 391' and he stated in his opinion the expert testimony
should have been allowed because "[t]he fact that Riker and Burke
were never involved in a battering relationship or an intimate
relationship of any kind is immaterial." '392
However, in another duress case, State v. Williams, 9 the
defendant and the batterer did have a long-term history of battering
within an intimate relationship.394 In that case, the Washington
Supreme Court upheld the use of the battered woman syndrome even
in a case in which the duress was not "immediate.""39 The defendant
claimed she had committed welfare fraud because she was forced to do
so by her abusive live-in boyfriend.396 At trial, Williams testified she
and her children would have suffered severe abuse or even death if she
disobeyed him. 397 A defense expert testified that she suffered from
battered woman syndrome, stating that a batterer need not be present
to exert control over his victim, and opining that the welfare fraud had
not been "willful" as required by the statute.3 98 The defense proposed
a jury instruction on duress, but the trial court declined to give it,
declaring that the threats to Williams were not sufficiently immediate
because the boyfriend was away at sea most of the time.399
Consequently, Williams was convicted.4 °0
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial
court, stating, "The duress statute does not require that it actually be
possible for the harm to be immediate. Rather, it directs the inquiry
at the defendant's belief, and whether such a belief is reasonable."4 ''
390. 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984).
391. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 371-72, 869 P.2d at 54.
392. Id. at 372, 869 P.2d at 54.
393. State v. Williams, 132 Wash. 2d 248, 937 P.2d 1052 (1997).
394. Id. at 251-52, 937 P.2d at 1054-55.
395. Id. at 258-60, 937 P.2d at 1058.
396. Id. at 253, 937 P.2d at 1055.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 258-59, 937 P.2d at 1058.
400. Id. at 253, 937 P.2d at 1055.
401. Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of how various jurisdictions handle battered
woman syndrome testimony in a duress context, see 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, 21-25 (2000).
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D. Washington Allows Expert Testimony Regarding Battered Woman's
Syndrome to Justify a More Lenient Sentence.
Use of the battered woman syndrome has also been upheld to
support giving a woman a sentence less than the standard range. In
one case, the defendant was originally charged with second degree
murder and manslaughter.4"2 She contended she acted in self-defense
and suffered from battered woman syndrome.4"' The jury found that
she lacked the requisite intent for second degree murder, but had not
acted in self-defense, and she was convicted of first degree
manslaughter.4 4 Because she had no prior criminal history, her
presumptive sentencing range was 31 to 41 months, but the trial court
sentenced her under an "exceptional" sentence of only 30 days of total
confinement, 30 days of partial confinement, and 240 hours of
community service, with an additional year of community
supervision.4 5 The court's justification for such a lenient sentence
was that her ability "to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct or
to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law was
significantly impaired because she is a battered woman."406 The
Washington Supreme Court upheld the sentence, stating that there
were adequate reasons supported by the record for imposing a more
lenient sentence, and that it was not "clearly too lenient.""4 7  The
Ninth Circuit has allowed such syndrome evidence in sentencing
under some circumstances.408
VI. LIMITATIONS OF SYNDROME EVIDENCE
As previously discussed, appellate courts in reviewing the
admission of expert testimony regarding trauma-related syndromes
evaluate the scientific evidence to determine if a given syndrome meets
the Frye test of "general acceptance" in the related field. They ask
whether there is evidence of universal or near-universal symptoms
resulting from each type of trauma, and whether those symptoms also
often occur among those who have not experienced the trauma. They
also ask whether those symptoms could be attributable to some other
trauma not relevant to the case.
402. State v. Pascal, 108 Wash. 2d 125, 736 P.2d 1065 (1987).
403. Id. at 129, 736 P.2d at 1068.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 129-30, 736 P.2dat 1068.
407. Id. at 139,736 P.2d at 1073.
408. See U.S. v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1992).
Seattle University Law Review
A. Rape Trauma Syndrome
The questions above, when applied to the concept of rape trauma
syndrome, lead us to an important inquiry: Can psychologists
determine whether it is more or less likely that a rape occurred merely
on the basis of a woman's description of her psychological symptoms?
One problem is that information about symptoms is usually
gathered by self-reporting mechanisms, whether received by interview
or psychological testing. Obviously, any expert proposing to state that
a person's symptoms are (or were) consistent with having been raped
should have corroborating information beyond the simple self-reports
of the alleged victim, since malingering is a distinct possibility, and
some studies have shown that trauma-related symptoms can be
faked.4 °9
Another problem is that some non-victims experience PTSD
symptoms. Studies consistently show that victims of sexual assault
report more symptoms of PTSD than do non-victims."' However,
there is usually considerable overlap between the two groups, which
makes it very difficult to state with any certainty what a "typical" rape
victim's symptoms would be. For example, in a study of female
college students who were victims of molestation, attempted rape,
coerced rape, and forcible rape, 34% of the women in the victimized
groups met the cut-off for PTSD on the Crime Related PTSD Scale,
but 22% of the non-victims also were categorized as having PTSD
Based on this study, it would be consistent with being raped that a
person showed PTSD, but it would also be consistent with being
raped that a person did not meet the criteria for PTSD. Similarly,
meeting the criteria for PTSD would be consistent with having been
raped, but would also be consistent with not having been raped!
The same problem seems to exist for the other symptoms that
frequently occur after rape. Numerous studies have assessed the
prevalence of depression between victims versus non-victims. These
studies have consistently shown a higher rate of depression and/or
depressive symptoms among victims than non-victims, but there is
always considerable overlap between the two groups. For example, in
a sample of victims from a rape crisis center, 38% of the victims met
the diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder at six months post
rape, but 16% of a matched comparison group also met the criteria for
409. Judith A. Lyons et al., The Potential for Faking on the Mississippi Scale for Combat
Related PTSD, 7 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 441, 444-45 (1994).
410. 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 123, n.27 (2000).
411. Id.
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that disorder.4 12 Another study found major depressive disorder in
48% of raped women, but found that 27% of women who had not been
raped also had major depressive disorder.4 13  Thus, it would be"consistent" with having been raped that the alleged victim either is
depressed or is not depressed, and either diagnosis would also be
consistent with not having been raped.
Similarly, although anxiety is a common symptom among those
who have been raped, it is also a common symptom among those who
have not been raped. One study found that 82% of victims showed
generalized anxiety disorder, but 32% of non-victims also suffered
from the same disorder.414 It is clear that comorbidity is also a
problem because PTSD symptoms overlap with the diagnostic criteria
for several other clinical disorders, including depression, panic
disorder, phobias, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and alcohol and
drug abuse.
Thus, it appears that a person who has been raped may show no
symptoms, may show PTSD symptoms, may be depressed, anxious,
or may show any combination of these symptoms. Similarly, a person
who has not been raped may show no symptoms, or any combination
of these symptoms. Any person's behavior after an alleged rape could
thus be "consistent" with either having been raped or not having been
raped. The well-documented research on the effects of rape tells us
much about what the range of effects can be across cases. However,
this research tells us very little about any individual case, since there is
no group of symptoms that is unique to having been raped. At the
same time, it is clear that a person who has been raped is more likely
to show symptoms of emotional distress than a person who has not
been raped, with an average 21% increase in the prevalence of
psychological distress in rape victims as compared to non-victims.41
From this point of view, the Washington Supreme Court appears
to be correct in its assertion that rape trauma evidence is not
sufficiently "reliable" to be used as it was in Black in which the expert
stated, "there is a specific profile of a rape victim, and (she) fits in. "416
412. Ellen Frank & Barbara Pazak Anderson, Psychiatric Disorders in Rape Victims: Past
History and Current Symptomatology, 28 COMP. PSYCHIATRY 77, 80 (1987).
413. 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 126 (2002).
414. Ellen Frank & Barbara Pazak Anderson, Psychiatric Disorders in Rape Victims: Past
History and Current Symptomatology, 28 COMP. PSYCHIATRY 77, 80 (1987).
415. Terri L. Weaver & George A. Clum, Psychological Distress Associated with
Interpersonal Violence: A Meta-Analysis, 15 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 115, 126 (1995).
416. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 339, 745 P.2d at 14.
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B. Child Abuse Syndromes
The same type of questions must be asked about the scientific
validity of child abuse syndromes, especially when introduced by
experts to show that sexual abuse has occurred. Are there valid"syndromes" that can be reliably distinguished between children who
have been sexually abused and those who have not? The evidence
suggests that there are not.
Susan McLeer and her colleagues examined sexually abused
children they found at an outpatient child psychiatry unit and
discovered that 49% met DSM-III-R criteria for PTSD with others
exhibiting at least some PTSD symptoms.417 In a follow up study,
McLeer and her colleagues compared sexually abused children from a
clinical setting with non-abused children from a clinical setting and
diagnosed 42% of the sexually abused children with PTSD as opposed
to only 9% with PTSD in the control group."' The most frequent
diagnosis in both groups was attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder.419 McLeer and her colleagues did another study in which the
sexually abused children were not drawn from a clinical setting; 36%
of this group met criteria for PTSD, and the majority had some PTSD
symptoms.4 2°  In another study, about half of the sexually abused
children who were referred to a child witness preparation program
exhibited some PTSD symptomatology. Girls (as opposed to boys)
and older children were more likely to qualify for PTSD diagnoses, as
were children whose abuse occurred over a longer period of time, and
those who were subjected to threats and/or coercion.4 21
Another study compared sexually abused children with
physically abused children and non-abused controls referred to a
foster care agency. 422 Sixty-four percent of the sexually abused
children showed PTSD, as compared to 42% of the physically abused
children, and 18% of the controls.423
417. Susan V. McLeer, M.D. et al., Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Sexually Abused
Children, 27 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 650, 652 (1988).
418. Susan V. McLeer, M.D. et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Sexually Abused Children, 33 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 313, 316 (1994).
419. Id.
420. Susan V. McLeer, M.D. et al., Non-Clinically Referred Sexually Abused Children, 37 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1132 (1998).
421. David A. Wolfe et al., Factors Associated with the Development of Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder Among Child Victims of Sexual Abuse, 18 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 37, 43 (1994).
422. Allison E. Dubner & Robert W. Motta, Sexually and Physically Abused Foster Care
Children and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 67 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 367,
371-72 (1999).
423. Id.
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Most researchers have concluded that sexual abuse leads to
higher rates of PTSD than other forms of abuse. 24 However, studies
do not show that PTSD is a near universal after-effect of sexual abuse,
with the above studies all showing almost half of the sexually abused
children not meeting the criteria for PTSD.
Major depression appears to be common among sexually abused
children. In a study of one hundred consecutive admissions to an
inpatient child psychiatric unit, 77% of the sexually abused children
were diagnosed with major depression (using the Diagnostic Interview
of Children and Adolescents), whereas only 33% of the physically
abused children and 10% of the non-abused controls were diagnosed
with major depression. However, there were only 13 sexually abused
children, a sample perhaps too small from which to make any
definitive conclusions.42'
There is some evidence that sexually abused children have on
average depressed IQ scores.426 Obviously, however, depressed IQ
scores could in no way be considered diagnostic of child sexual abuse.
Another way to approach the problem is to look exclusively at children
who have been abused. One study looked at children with sexually
transmitted diseases. Half of the children showed behavioral
symptoms, but half of them did not.427
These studies are based on children admitted to hospitals for
treatment, or children whose abuse has been officially reported to the
authorities, so they are not generalizable to sexually abused children
generally. Rind and his colleagues did a meta-analysis of the literature
on the effects of child sexual abuse, relying on college students' data
and survey data instead of clinical or legal samples.42 a  Their
conclusion was that victims of childhood sexual abuse rarely
experience more adverse psychological symptoms later in life than
people who were not sexually abused.429  These studies are
controversial, but have not yet been replicated scientifically.
424. See, e.g., Sue Boney-McCoy & David Finkelhor, Psychosocial Sequelae of Violent
Victimization in a National Youth Sample, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 726, 733-
35 (1995).
425. Richard Livingston, M.D., Sexually and Physically Abused Children, 26 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 413, 414 (1987).
426. Normand J. Carrey et al., Physiological and Cognitive Correlates of Child Abuse, 34 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1067, 1067-73 (1995).
427. Louarme Lawson & Mark Chaffin, False Negatives in Sexual Abuse Disclosure
Interviews, 7 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 532, 540 (1992).
428. Bruce Rind and Philip Tromovitch, A Meta-Analytic Examination of Assumed
Properties of Child Sexual Abuse Using College Samples, 124 PSYCHOL. BULL. 22 (1998); Bruce
Rind & Philip Tromovitch, A Meta-Analytic Review of Findings from National Samples of
Psychological Correlates of Child Sexual Abuse, 34 J. SEXUAL RES. 237 (1997).
429. Id.
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Indeed, studies on non-clinical populations appearing since the
Rind, et al., meta-analysis have uncovered adverse consequences of
childhood sexual abuse.4"' Findings from the Adverse Childhood
Experiences (ACE) study (performed in a non-clinical setting) show
that adults who report a history of childhood sexual abuse are about
three times more likely to have attempted suicide at least once during
their lives.43' Furthermore, adults who report a history of childhood
sexual abuse are also statistically more likely to report that they are
suffering from alcoholism, drug abuse, depression, smoking,
promiscuity, sexually transmitted disease, and obesity, as well as a
number of medical conditions such as cancer, ischemic heart disease,
and liver disease.432
In summary, "findings suggest the absence of any specific
syndrome in children who have been sexually abused and no single
traumatizing process. ' ' 43 3  The notion that there is any one"syndrome" or pattern of symptoms specific to child sexual abuse
does not appear to iold up to scientific scrutiny. Even the commonly
believed idea that sexually abused children exhibit more sexual
behavior problems does not appear to hold up. A multi-disciplinary
team investigated the diagnostic utility of sexual behavior problems in
diagnosing child sexual abuse using the Child Sexual Behavior
Inventory (CSBI), and sexually abused children were found to be no
more likely to have high CSBI scores than non-sexually abused
children. 434 For many years, many people believed that a child's style
of play with anatomically correct dolls could corroborate sexual abuse,
but there is now general agreement that such use of the dolls is
improper.4 31 Various structured interview approaches have been put
forth as methods to determine the truth or falsity of children's
430. Kenneth S. Kendler, M.D. et al., Child Sexual Abuse and Adult Psychiatric and
Substance Disorders in Women: An Epidemiological and Cotwin Control Analysis, 57 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 953, 953-59 (2000); Elliot C. Nelson et al., Association between Self-Reported
Childhood Sexual Abuse and Adverse Psychosocial Stressors: Results from a Twin Study, 59 ARCH.
GEN PSYCHIATRY 139, 139-45 (2002).
431. Shanta R. Dube, M.P.H. et al., Childhood Abuse, Household Dysfunction, and the Risk
of Attempted Suicide Throughout the Life Spans: Findings from the Adverse Childhood Experiences
Study, 286 JAMA 3089, 3093 (Dec. 26, 2001).
432. Vincent J. Felitti, M.D., F.A.C.P. et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and
Household Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: The Adverse Childhood
Experiences (ACE) Study, 14 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 245, 252-53 (1998).
433. Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett et al., Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A Review and
Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 164, 164 (1996).
434. Kerry M. Drach et al., The Diagnostic Utility of Sexual Behavior Problems in Diagnosing
Sexual Abuse in a Forensic Child Abuse Evaluation Clinic, 25 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 489,
500-01 (2001).
435. Gerald P. Koocher et al., Psychological Science and the Use of Anatomically Detailed
Dolls in Child Sexual Assessments, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 2, 199, 218 (1995).
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statements about alleged sexual abuse, most notably Yuille's statement
validity analysis, but there is little research to support the notion that
statement validity analysis content analysis can reliably differentiate
between true and false allegations.436
C. Battered Person Syndromes
Expert testimony regarding the concepts of battered woman
syndrome and battered child syndrome are usually admissible by a
person claiming self-defense. However, we have not yet determined
whether scientific literature bears out the claim that these syndromes
can reliably distinguish between people who have been battered and
those who have not. To do so, we must first remember what the
central symptoms of battered woman syndrome purportedly are.
Then we can look for studies showing that most or all individuals who
have been battered show those symptoms, and that those symptoms
are not common among individuals who have not been battered.
1. Battered Woman's Syndrome
Use of the concept of the "battered woman syndrome" has been
an improvement over traditional approaches to dealing with women
claiming self-defense. It has helped overcome sex-bias in the law of
self-defense, as the objective standard of the "reasonable person" has
been replaced by the more subjective standard of what a reasonable
woman with the defendant's history and mental make-up would do.
However, adoption of the battered woman syndrome concept brought
with it its own set of problems. Critics recognized that battered
woman syndrome perpetuated some of the same stereotypic images of
battered women that feminists had fought to overcome.437  The
rationale for admission of testimony about battered woman syndrome
was a woman's weakness, dependency, and passivity, and the
testimony was "presented, interpreted, and heard as victimization. 438
The assertion that "learned helplessness" was a common
symptom among battered women has been heavily criticized.439 In her
original study, Walker compared the responses of women who were
436. C.L. Ruby & John C. Brigham, The Usefulness of the Criterion-Based Content and
Analysis Technique in Distinguishing Between Truth and Fabricated Allegations, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL'Y & L. 4, 705, 717-18 (1997).
437. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and
the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195, 220-21 (1986).
438. Id. at 200.
439. See, e.g. Paula Finley Mangum, Reconceptualizing Battered Woman Syndrome
Evidence: Prosecution Use of Expert Testimony on Battering, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 593,
606-07 (1999).
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still in battering relationships to women who had left a battering
relationship. Walker concluded that the results were compatible with
learned helplessness theory, but Walker presented no statistical tests
of differences between the groups.44 ° Walker did not compare women
in battering relationships to women who were not in battering
relationships or to women who had left men in non-abusive
relationships. A number of researchers have argued that the passive
characterization of battered women conveyed through the learned
helplessness theory is flawed, and they have presented data in support
of their position. One study, which was conducted by means of a
questionnaire in a national women's magazine, found that women use
a wide range of strategies in their attempts to end violence.441
Although the notion of learned helplessness applied to a subset of the
women surveyed, the vast majority of the women surveyed engaged in
a variety of positive responses in an attempt to end abuse.442 From
interviews conducted with battered women, another study found that
women employ a wide range of behaviors that are inconsistent with
the concept of learned helplessness.443 One group documented thirty-
one common strategies women use to try to end abuse.444 Indeed,
women frequently attempt to leave battering relationships, although
attempts at separation are often very dangerous.44 5 Women who
remain in battering relationships may do so because of economic
dependence upon the batterer, not because of learned helplessness.446
Women also stay in battering relationships because social services and
police agencies provide limited assistance to battered women
attempting to end abuse.447
The other central tenet of the battered woman's syndrome, the
"cycle of violence" concept, has been heavily criticized. Walker's
theory suggests that battering relationships often show a cyclical
pattern with three main phases: (1) a period of tension building, (2)
the acute battering incident or explosion, and (3) a period of loving
440. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 281, at xiii.
441. LEE H. BOWKER, ENDING THE VIOLENCE 19-33 (1986).
442. Richard J. Gelles, Ph.D., & Murray A. Straus, Ph.D., INTIMATE VIOLENCE, 156
(1988).
443. R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, The Nature and Antecedents of Violent
Events, 24 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 269 (1984).
444. Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic
Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2136 (1993).
445. Emma Morton et al., Partner Homicide Suicide Involving Female Homicide Victims: A
Population Based Study in North Carolina, 13 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 91, 103 (1998).
446. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 281, at 127-144.
447. Judith S. Gordon, Community Services for Abused Women: A Review of Perceived
Usefulness and Efficacy, 11 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 315, 318-28 (1996).
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contrition. 48  Walker's original study involved interviews with
predominately white, middle-class women drawn from Walker's
clinical practice or volunteers.449 She later did a more extensive
interview study of 400 battered women, using a 200-page
questionnaire. a0 Open ended questions were asked as to whether the
abuser's behavior prior to the beatings was "irritable, provocative,
aggressive, hostile, threatening," and whether the abuser's behavior
following the abusive incident was "nice, loving, contrite. ' 451 The
women rated each of these adjectives on a five-point scale. No data
were presented regarding the percentage of cases in which all three
phases of the cycle occurred. There was evidence of a tension-
building phase in about two-thirds of the cases, and there was
evidence of loving contrition after the abusive incident in fifty-eight
percent of the cases.452 Based on this data, Walker concluded there
was support for the cycle of violence theory, although close to half the
cases did not conform to the three-stage cycle of violence concept.
Numerous commentators have called into question the validity ofWalker's conclusions. 4 3 The methodology of the study itself has also
been criticized because of its frequent use of leading questions.4 4
Various researchers have studied to what extent the three-stage cycle
of violence concept fits the data, and have concluded that a wide
variety of patterns exist, with more variability than postulated by
Walker.455 Mary Ann Dutton, a highly respected domestic violence
researcher, has concluded that there is no characteristic cycle of
violence.45 6  In her later work, Walker indicated that not all
448. See WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 281, WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 281.
449. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 281, ix-xviii (1979).
450. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 281, 226-27 (1984).
451. 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 43 (2002). For a description of the methodology of the study
from Walker's perspective, see WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note
281, at 225-232.
452. 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 43 (2002).
453. See, e.g., Marilyn McMahon, Battered Women and Bad Science: The Limited Validity
and Utility of the Battered Woman Syndrome, 6 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 23 (1999).
454. David L. Faigman, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and
Empirical Dissent, 73 VA. L. REV 619, 637 (1986).
455. "Taken in their entirety, these studies indicate that the cycle does not characterize all
battering relationships and that the pattern is not necessarily an invariable cycle with three clear
and distinct phases." 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 45 (2002).
456. See id.
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relationships follow the three-stage cycle of violence pattern and that
variations in the pattern can be found.4 57
If neither the learned helplessness theory nor the cycle of
violence theory is truly diagnostic of battering, then it seems clear that
diagnosing battered woman syndrome using these symptoms is not a
valid way to determine whether a woman has truly been battered. It is
apparent that many women in battering relationships will not show
those symptoms, whereas women who have not been battered may
show such symptoms. Nonetheless, the American Psychological
Association (APA) has endorsed the validity of battered woman
syndrome in amicus briefs it has filed in homicide cases by battered
women. 458
The issue of diagnostic accuracy becomes relevant when a court
allows an expert to offer an opinion about whether an individual
actually suffers from battered woman syndrome (or battered child
syndrome), as is allowed in Washington homicide cases where the
defendant is claiming self-defense.4"9 Some courts feel that matters of
diagnostic accuracy are not germane to the relevancy of the testimony,
but only to the weight such testimony should be given. However,
even under this argument, the weight given to the testimony should
depend upon the extent to which battered woman syndrome has a
demonstrated body of unique symptoms, and thus, diagnostic
reliability. 6°
It seems clear that if the defense presents expert testimony that
battered woman syndrome does have unique symptoms and that the
defendant suffers from them, then the prosecution will also be allowed
to present expert testimony that battered woman syndrome is not an
accurate diagnostic category, and/or that the defendant does not suffer
from battered woman syndrome. If a defense expert has examined
and diagnosed the defendant, then the court will almost certainly allow
an expert for the prosecution to examine and diagnose the defendant.
If the defendant does not show symptoms of learned helplessness and
cycle of violence, the prosecution's expert may testify that she does not
suffer from battered woman syndrome, lending support for the
contention that she did not fear imminent harm, and thus is guilty of
murder. This unseemly "battle of the experts" would likely open up
457. See id. (citing Lenore E.A. Walker, Psychology and Law Symposium: Women and the
Law, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1170, 1181-85 (1993)).
458. Reported in 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP 245,253-57 (1986).
459. See State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984); State v. Janes, 121 Wash.
2d 220, 850 P.2d 495 (1993).
460. See Regina A. Schuller & Neil Vidmar, Battered Woman Evidence in the Courtroom, 16
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 273,278-79 (1992).
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many areas of the defendant's personal history for discussion in court.
Furthermore, such conflicting testimony could be prejudicial to the
defendant, especially if she were battered and did fear imminent harm,
but she did not show symptoms of learned helplessness and the cycle
of violence. In other words, the diagnostic inaccuracy of the battered
woman syndrome concept could result in the conviction of a woman
who truly did fear imminent harm, since prosecution experts could
argue that the defendant was not a battered woman because she did
not have the symptoms of battered woman syndrome.
If the courts treat battered woman syndrome as a standard to
which all battered women must conform, those battered women whose
symptoms do not conform to battered woman syndrome will be
prejudiced.461 The less similar the defendant's symptoms are to the
prototypical battered woman as described by Walker, the greater the
prejudice will be.
These concerns seem to lead to the conclusion that experts
should not personally evaluate and diagnose the defendant, or if they
do, the experts should restrict their diagnoses to PTSD or other DSM-
IV-TR diagnoses that have general acceptance among psychologists
and psychiatrists and well-defined, scientifically proven diagnostic
criteria. Courts should allow experts to testify only as to what
symptoms are common among battered women, without making the
additional leap that the defendant has a syndrome that proves she was
battered, or proves that she thought she was facing imminent harm.
As long as a defense expert has not personally evaluated the
defendant, there would be no justification for a prosecution expert to
personally examine her, and a prosecution expert would be limited to
testifying as to whether the defendant's symptoms were symptoms
commonly reported by battered women. Consequently, the diagnosis
of battered woman syndrome (or any other diagnosis such as PTSD)
could not be unfairly used to the prejudice of either side.
Not all women who have been battered suffer from PTSD.
Studies indicate that battered women are at risk for developing PTSD;
estimates range from 31% to 81%, and most studies show that the
severity of the violence experienced is positively related to the
presence of PTSD and PTSD symptomatology.462 Golding did a
meta-analysis, reviewing the literature on the prevalence of mental
health problems among women who have been physically abused by
461. See Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in
Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 121,144 (1985).
462. 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 58 (2002).
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an intimate male partner. Among the eleven studies that assessed
PTSD, 63.8% of the women showed PTSD. Across the eighteen
studies that included measures of depression, 47.6% of the women
suffered depression. Among the ten studies that measured
assessments of alcohol abuse, 18.5% of the women showed alcohol
abuse. Finally, among the thirteen studies that included suicidiality,
the prevalence was 17. 9%.463 Thus, it would be incorrect for an expert
to testify that since a given defendant did not suffer from PTSD (or
did not suffer from depression, suicidiality, or alcohol abuse) she must
not have been a battered woman. In other words, no one diagnosis or
syndrome is diagnostic of battering.
2. Battered Child Syndrome
The term "battered child syndrome" is confusing, because it has
been used in at least two different contexts with very different
meanings. A pediatrician coined the phrase in 1962 as a way of
describing the injuries very young children receive when they have
been physically abused, such as subdural hematomas, fractures of long
bones, and multiple soft tissue injuries.464 This syndrome is admissible
in Washington and in most other jurisdictions when it is introduced
by the State through a physician expert witness in an attempt to prove
that the child's injuries were intentional rather than accidental.465
This article does not concern itself with this use of the concept of
battered child syndrome. This article does concern itself, however,
with battered child syndrome evidence, usually introduced by a
defense expert to show how learned helplessness and the cycle of
violence can cause a child to kill his abuser in circumstances that
might otherwise not appear reasonable. In Janes,466for example, the
Washington Supreme Court acknowledged parallels between women
and children who kill their abusers after years of family violence.
Some scholars have suggested the use of the term "battered person
463. Jacqueline M. Golding, Intimate Partner Violence as a Risk Factor for Mental
Disorders: A Meta-Analysis, 14 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 99 (1999).
464. C. Henry Kempe, M.D. et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17, 105
(1962).
465. See State v. Norlin, 134 Wash. 2d 570, 585, 951 P.2d 1131, 1138 (1998) (J. Talmadge,
concurring, cites favorably to State v. Mulder, 22 Wash. App 513, 516-16, 629 P.2d 462, 463-
464 (1981)); State v. Toennis, 52 Wash. App. 176, 185, 158 P.2d 539, 545 (1988).
466. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d 220, 235, 850 P.2d 495, 502 (1993).
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syndrome" '467 to encompass both battered woman syndrome and
battered child syndrome.468
The term "battered child syndrome" has not been widely
adopted within the scientific community. The term has most
frequently been used by Paul Mones,469 a defense attorney, to explain
acts of parricide by adolescent boys. Mones' observations have been
gleaned from his experience with parricide cases, and he uses the
theory of "self-preservation" to explain parricide.47°  Scientific
information about perpetrators of parricide is fairly limited. Child
abuse frequently precedes parricides, but "reliable estimates of the
prevalence of child maltreatment in parricides" is not possible because"studies have lumped together mild and severe physical abuse, sexual
abuse, verbal abuse, psychological abuse, and in some cases physical
and psychological neglect."'471
A number of scientific studies have examined the prevalence of
PTSD, as well as other psychiatric disorders, in abused children. In a
study focusing exclusively on physical abuse, physically abused
adolescents were compared with matched controls on the PTSD
module of the Structured Clinical Interview for Diagnosis.472 The
authors concluded that PTSD was not evident in higher proportions in
the physically abused group.4 73  In a much larger study comparing
physically abused children with non-abused children, a wide range of
psychopathology was reported among the abused group.474 However,
researchers concluded that there is no specific syndrome or diagnosis
associated with physical abuse.47 In a study of severely maltreated
children, 40% of the children evaluated met the criteria for PTSD.
Two years later, 33% of these children still retained the diagnosis.476 A
review of the literature on physical abuse concluded that
467. Georgia extends the theory to men in Freeman v. State, 496 S.E.2d 716, 718 (Ga.
1998).
468. Steven R. Hicks, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Psychology of the Battered
Child, 11 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 103, 106 (1987).
469. Paul Mones, When the Innocent Strike Back: Abused Children Who Kill Their Parents,
8 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 297 (1993).
470. Id. at 297-99.
471. Marc Hillbrand et al., Parricides: Characteristics of Offenders and Victims, Legal
Factors, and Treatment Issues, 4 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 179, 182 (1998).
472. David Pelcovitz, Ph.D. et al., Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Physically Abused
Adolescents, 33 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 305 (1994).
473. Id. at 309.
474. Alan J. Flisher, Ph.D., Characteristics of Physically Abused Children and Adolescents, 36
J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 123 (1997).
475. Id. at 127.
476. Richard Famularo et al., Persistence of Pediatric Post Traumatic Stress Disorder After
Two Years, 20 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1245, 1247 (1996).
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approximately 8% of physically abused children and adolescents have
current diagnoses of major depressive disorder, and at least 30% "have
lifetime disruptive disorder diagnoses.""47  Taken together, these
research findings are not supportive of any diagnosis or syndrome as
diagnostic of physical abuse among children. Therefore, the term
battered child syndrome does not appear to be an accepted scientific
term.
VII. BASE RATE CONSIDERATIONS
Even assuming that syndromes or profiles such as rape trauma
syndrome, child abuse syndrome, battered woman syndrome, and
PTSD could be shown to be scientifically sound, testimony about such
syndromes could be inherently misleading due to base rate differences.
Melton offers a hypothetical example.478 Suppose a syndrome or
profile could be devised that was so powerful that it could identify
90% of women who had been raped, 90% of children who had been
sexually abused, or 90% of women who had been battered. Assume
that 5% of women in the general population have been raped, that 5%
of children in the general population have been sexually abused, and
that 5% of the women in the general population have been severely
battered. If an individual fits the profile, what is the probability that
the person has actually been abused? If 1,000 people were examined,
the profile would correctly identify 90% of those who had been raped,
abused, or battered. Assuming that 50 individuals (5%) have been
raped, sexually abused, or battered, the profile would correctly
identify 45 individuals (true-positives). However, the profile would
also identify 10% of those who had not been raped, sexually abused, or
battered as having been raped (false-positives). Out of 950 who had
not been raped, sexually abused, or battered, the profile would
incorrectly identify 95 (10%) as having been raped (false-positives).
The profile would identify a total of 130 individuals (45 true-positives
and 95 false-positives) as having been raped, sexually abused, or
battered. Only 45 of the individuals identified by the profile (35%)
would actually have been raped, sexually abused, or battered.
However, upon hearing that an alleged victim met the profile, a judge
or jury would probably not realize that, because of the base rates, the
probability that the alleged victim had actually been raped, sexually
abused, or battered was low.
477. Sandra J. Kaplan et al., Child and Adolescent Abuse and Neglect Research: A Review of
the Past Ten Years, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1214, 1217 (1999).
478. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 195 (1997).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The scientific evidence suggests that rape trauma syndrome, the
various child abuse syndromes, and battered woman syndrome are
terms that were originally coined to help with clinical and therapeutic
issues. These terms are still very helpful in clinical contexts to help
understand the trauma process; however, they are not useful
forensically, as they are not diagnostic of rape, child abuse, or
battering. Furthermore, these terms do not have well-defined,
scientifically proven symptoms. Therefore, they are not generally
accepted among the community of psychologists and psychiatrists,
and they are not included in the DSM-IV-TR. Traumatized
individuals may show many types of psychological reactions,479
including learned helplessness and the cycle of violence, anxiety,
depression, substance abuse, accommodation, PTSD, or any
combination of these symptoms. Additionally, it is not uncommon for
traumatized individuals to show no adverse psychological reactions at
all.4"' All people who suffer a given trauma do not show specific
behaviors unique to that trauma.4 1
Testimony from an expert describing in general what the
common symptoms of traumatization are will be helpful to the trier of
fact under ER 702 if scientific studies are cited and opposing counsel
is allowed to provide contrary scientific authority before admissibility
is determined. However, testimony that certain symptoms are merely"consistent with" trauma (as opposed to "common to" trauma) is
meaningless, since almost any post-trauma symptom or behavior could
occur; therefore, such testimony is of limited probative value and
should not be allowed.
Courts that allow mental health professionals to personally
evaluate traumatized individuals and to make diagnostic statements
about them in front of the trier of fact have reached incorrect
conclusions about the scientific acceptability and scientific validity of
these concepts. Washington has made the correct decision by
excluding rape trauma syndrome and the various child abuse
syndromes as profiles that are not generally accepted in the scientific
community. However, by ruling that battered woman syndrome and
battered child syndrome are accepted diagnostic terms within the
scientific community, Washington courts have erred. There is no
479. See also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 4, at 465. See generally Patricia A. Frazier, Rape
Trauma Syndrome: The Scientific Status of Research on Rape Trauma Syndrome, in 2 MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 117-143 (2002).
480. See infra, pp. 506-17.
481. Id.
Seattle University Law Review
commonly agreed upon set of symptoms for battered woman
syndrome or battered child syndrome. Additionally, there is no set of
symptoms that is universal or near-universal and unique or near-
unique to battering. Thus, the use of the term "battered syndrome"
unfairly prejudices the trier of fact against the alleged batterer, since
the term itself unfairly suggests there is a syndrome that is diagnostic
of battering. If courts do allow mental health professionals to
personally evaluate allegedly traumatized individuals, and to make
diagnostic statements about them in front of the trier of fact, the
courts should restrict the professionals from testifying about any
diagnoses not included in DSM-IV-TR. In certain cases, DSM-IV-
TR's diagnoses of PTSD, acute stress disorder, major depression,
generalized anxiety disorder, etc., may be appropriate, as these
diagnoses do not presume to be able to determine whether abuse has
actually occurred. Furthermore, diagnoses included in the DSM-IV-
TR are scientifically derived, well defined, and accepted in the
scientific community.
The danger involved in allowing mental health professionals to
make any diagnostic statement (including PTSD and other DSM-IV-
TR diagnoses) about an alleged victim of abuse in a criminal case is
that experts for opposing counsel will almost certainly be allowed to
evaluate the individual, and to delve into all aspects of that person's
history, including sexual experiences, prior traumas, mental health
treatment records, etc. Such "battles of the experts" can traumatize
the alleged victim, erroneously shift the focus of the criminal case to
issues that are only peripherally relevant to the charges involved, and
undermine shield statutes that nearly all jurisdictions have enacted.
The better approach is not to allow mental health experts to
personally evaluate the alleged victim of abuse. Courts should only
allow general mental health testimony about what symptoms
traumatized individuals commonly have after the other side has"opened the door" by claiming that the alleged victim's post-trauma
behavior was inconsistent with the behavior of victimized persons.
Courts should not allow testimony about common reactions to trauma
unless an expert can point to specific studies in scientific literature
demonstrating the validity of those claims. Experts should not be
allowed to testify as to what constitutes common reactions to trauma
based solely on their own experience, since such impressions cannot be
challenged or rebutted by scientific means because they are not
objective, systematic, or scientific. Furthermore, mental health
professionals may be able to claim in their experience they have seen a
number of alleged victims, but they will not have been able to
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systematically compare "true-victims" with "false-victims." Finally,
the Frye standard should control in Washington, and unsupported
statements about what an expert has commonly seen in his or her
practice should not be allowed.
